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“It was all to be done in thirds. I was to get 1/3 for doing 
the typing, and she was to get 1/3 for doing the editing, and he 
was to get 1/3 for writing the novel. 
“We were going to divide the royalties three ways. We all 
shook hands on the deal, each knowing what we were supposed 
to do, the path before us, the gate at the end. 
“I was made a 1/3 partner because I had the typewriter.”1 
 
 “This was the beginning of a process when each of Conklin 
and Perdue made allegations against the other, both in the na-
ture of causing harm to CPI and in the nature of breaching fi-
duciary duties to each other. The business divorce had begun in 
earnest and eventually found its way, as most divorces do, into 
the hands of a judge for resolution of issues colored much more 
by emotion than economic or business reality.”2 
 
Disputes involving closely held businesses come in primar-
ily two varieties. When, as is often the case, the business fails, 
creditors bring lawsuits seeking to pierce the corporate veil in 
an attempt to reach the assets of the business owners.3 When 
the business does well, on the other hand, minority owners of-
ten accuse those in control of seeking ways to keep a bigger 
slice of the profit pie and of squeezing or freezing out minority 
owners.4 These latter disputes are often categorized under the 
rubric of minority shareholder oppression; and attempts to deal 
with them by statute and judicial decision are as old as corpo-
rate law.5 Moreover, they are not unique to business in the 
 
 1. Richard Brautigan, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, in AMERICAN SHORT STORY MAS-
TERPIECES 71, 71 (Raymond Carver & Tom Jenks eds., 1987). 
 2. Conklin v. Perdue, No. 990335BLS, 2002 WL 31421763, at *5 (Super. 
Ct. Mass. Sept. 17, 2002). 
 3. See John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing 
the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to 
Codify the Test for Waiving Owners’ Limited Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. 
REV. 147, 149–50 (2000) (discussing creditors’ attempts to pierce the corporate 
veil to reach an owner’s assets). 
 4. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, 
Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 
78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1461 (1994) (“[The] traditional shareholder primacy 
model” includes the right of a corporation’s majority shareholders “to control 
its destiny, determine its fundamental policies, and decide whether to make 
fundamental changes in corporate policy and practice.”); D. Gordon Smith, The 
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277, 310–22 (1998) (tracing 
the history of shareholder oppression cases). 
 5. Smith, supra note 4, at 310. 
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United States; rather, they are part of the fabric of modern 
business organization law on a global scale.6 
The source of this oppression, majority rule in corporate 
governance, arose in response to the problem of oppression by a 
minority: Early corporation statutes required unanimity for 
major decisions, permitting a holdout minority owner to extract 
a windfall for consent to a mutually beneficial proposed action.7 
Legislatures responded by permitting corporations to make 
fundamental decisions with less than unanimity.8 Further legal 
refinements, like the business judgment rule and the doctrine 
of independent legal significance, permitted corporations to act 
more decisively even in the face of shareholder dissent.9 The 
unhappy shareholder has two main options: sell the shares on 
the market or, when provided by statute, petition for dissent 
and appraisal rights. But when a majority shareholder in a 
closely held corporation uses these same powers to “freeze out” 
the minority by, inter alia, (lawfully) voting him off the board 
and by (lawfully) eliminating dividends, the minority share-
holder has no effective remedy. No one will buy the shares, and 
statutory appraisal rights are not triggered. 
Virtually every state recognizes, at least in some way, that 
the individual who becomes an owner by joining an entrepre-
neurial or development-stage enterprise finds herself in a posi-
tion profoundly different from the investor who buys shares of 
Microsoft through a broker.10 The closely held corporation, by 
definition, has relatively few shareholders,11 meaning that eve-
 
 6. See, e.g., A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS’ REMEDIES 38–59, 
90–118 (2002) (discussing English company law governing minority share-
holders’ remedies from historical, theoretical, and comparative perspectives); 
Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then & 
Now, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 36–38 (2002) (noting the severity of minor-
ity shareholder oppression in China). 
 7.  See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Ap-
praisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 11–14 (1995) (providing a con-
cise discussion of early corporation statutes in the present context).  
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL 
AND THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEM-
BERS § 3.3 (rev. 2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2006) (explaining that majority control 
and business judgment rule principles embedded in corporation statutes se-
verely limit the options of a minority shareholder). 
 10. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 
1975) (outlining some of the reasons why owning stock in a closely held corpo-
ration differs from owning stock in a large and publicly traded corporation). 
 11. Id. (“[A] close corporation [is] typified by . . . a small number of stock-
holders.”). 
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ryone knows everyone. These business relationships often begin 
with little or no pre-planning for an eventual (if not inevitable) 
breakup. Adding to the potential for conflict, the majority and 
minority shareholders frequently participate in the corpora-
tion’s management.12 Finally, there is no ready market for the 
shares.13 So when disagreements reach a boil, they cannot be 
resolved by placing a sell order with a broker. 
Yet even if most courts and commentators can agree that 
closely held corporations are different, they have struggled to 
articulate how these differences should alter the rules of en-
gagement in disputes between minority and majority share-
holders. Those who argue that the permissive rules governing 
large corporations should also apply to closely held corporations 
often contend, in essence, that the oppression “cure” is worse 
than the disease.14 Those in favor of greater judicial interven-
tion contend that shareholders in closely held corporations are, 
in essence, partners in an ongoing economic and social relation-
ship, and that the unique nature of the closely held corporation 
requires special remedies when one owner acts inconsistently 
with the interests or expectations of another.15 
 
 12. Id. There are other good reasons for differentiating the close corpora-
tion shareholder from his public counterparts. The minority owner generally 
expects to draw a salary, which is often a de facto dividend. Also, minority 
shareholders can face unusual and burdensome tax consequences if the corpo-
ration is a subchapter S corporation, since the flow-through nature of the en-
tity requires the minority shareholder to pay taxes on his pro rata income even 
if he is fired from his job and receives no dividends from the corporation. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Dennis S. Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in 
the United States, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 663 (1989) (“[T]he case against special 
statutes to protect close corporation shareholders is even stronger than it was 
ten years ago.”); Timothy J. Storm, Remedies for Oppression of Non-
Controlling Shareholders in Illinois Closely-Held Corporations: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Gone, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 379, 380 (2002) (“[T]he costs of oppres-
sion theory substantially outweigh the demonstrated benefits.”); Bryn Vaaler, 
Scrap the Minnesota Business Corporation Act!, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1365, 1374–75 (2002). See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 228–43 (1991) (dis-
cussing the differences between closely held corporations and publicly held 
corporations). 
 15. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for 
Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 702 (1993) (“Traditional corporate norms, ori-
ented as they are toward publicly held corporations, proved unsuitable for 
close corporations. Within a closely held enterprise, a more intimate and in-
tense relationship exists between capital and labor. There is no market for the 
corporation’s shares and no separation of function between those who provide 
the capital and those who manage the enterprise.”). 
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A true legislative and judicial patchwork has emerged. 
Each state has a unique regime for addressing minority share-
holder oppression in closely held businesses—a surprising state 
of affairs for such an important area of corporate law. This 
phenomenon is exacerbated by the development and use of the 
limited liability company—that is, the problem of oppression is 
one involving the closely held businesses, not just closely held 
corporations.16 Any resolution of the conundrum should be ap-
plicable across business entity types.17 
We contend that the development of this area of law in-
volves a desire by courts and legislatures to provide an exit 
strategy for minority owners in closely held businesses. While 
most states have concluded that a buyout of the minority 
owner’s interest by the company (or the majority owner) is the 
preferred solution, there is discordance as to the bases for 
granting that desired remedy. That is, there is evolution and 
divergence over the factual and legal predicates to providing li-
quidity to the minority owner. 
The Appendix highlights these conclusions. We undertook 
a completely independent and exhaustive state-by-state analy-
sis of the statutes and case law of minority oppression to de-
termine the underlying circumstances and the nature of the re-
lief granted by courts and legislatures. The Appendix, labeled 
“Shareholder Oppression Standards and Remedies,” includes 
the most important aspects of our fifty-state survey. For each 
jurisdiction, the Appendix reports the type of statute, the stan-
 
 16. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability 
Company: Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 883 passim (2005) [hereinafter Moll, Minority Oppression & the LLC] 
(explaining that many closely held businesses are not close corporations but 
limited liability corporations and concluding that the problems of minority op-
pression exist in both structures). 
 17. While this Article focuses on disputes involving the closely held busi-
nesses in whatever form, there is a pressing need for a broader application and 
rationalization of law across the various business entity forms. See Harry J. 
Haynsworth, The Unified Business Organizations Code: The Next Generation, 
29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83, 90 (2004) (“‘The law of business organizations has thus 
become a hodge-podge of unwieldy, illogical, and even irrational legislation 
and decisions bristling with incoherence and inconsistencies. Bursting at the 
seams, the fabric of business organizational law currently blanketing the na-
tion has become a variegated quilt of legal passwords.’ I concur in this assess-
ment. If anything, the situation is worse today than it was in 1996. I also con-
cur with the authors’ conclusion that ‘[f ]undamental reform of business 
organization law is both imperative and inevitable.’” (alteration in original) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a 
Unified Business Organization Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996))). 
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dard of liability, whether a buyout is permitted, and the context 
for the buyout remedy. 
We conclude that states have been grappling uneasily with 
establishing a way to provide relief in the form of a buyout exit 
for the minority business owner. Constrained by the traditional 
common law concept that a remedy should only follow where a 
wrong has been committed, the states have been haplessly 
mired in the task of determining the proper bases upon which 
to grant this separation remedy. One solution to this morass is 
a model statute that provides liquidity to the disgruntled mi-
nority owner without the wasteful and acrimonious litigation 
attendant to resolution of such disputes today. The goal of this 
Article is to develop and defend this solution. 
Part I discusses the state of the law of closely held corpora-
tion disputes. Importantly, the law has both evolved and con-
verged. Evolution has taken place in an attempt to define the 
bases for relief for the minority business owner. Convergence 
has occurred in lawmakers’ attempts to provide a liquidity-
based remedy. The flailing tail of potential predicates for relief 
has been wagging the dog of desired remedial results. Part II 
examines why the current resolutions are inadequate and pro-
poses a statutory reform model. Part II also addresses some 
possible concerns about the proposed statutory solution and 
provides the context for states to move forward to adopt the 
model statute as part of their business organization law. 
I.  THE REQUIREMENTS AND REMEDIES FOR MINORITY 
OPPRESSION: EVOLUTION AND CONVERGENCE   
Development of the cause of action for minority business 
owner oppression can be divided roughly into three groups of 
states. First, some states have developed relief for minority op-
pression as a matter of common law jurisprudence. This devel-
opment differs only slightly from many other state legislatures 
that have followed the Model Business Corporation Act 
(MBCA)18 in adopting minimalist statutory language that sim-
ply permits relief when a shareholder acts in an oppressive 
manner.19 In general, however, the legislatures in these MBCA-
 
 18. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(ii) (2002), available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/buslaw/library/onlinepublications/mbca2002.pdf (providing 
that a shareholder may petition for dissolution when “the directors or those in 
control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is 
illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent”). 
 19. Nine states have dissolution statutes that do not use the word oppres-
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influenced states have not attempted to define what constitutes 
oppressive conduct or to set out what range of remedies is 
available, leaving those vexing questions to the courts and 
common law.20 Second, a few state legislatures have adopted 
what might we might loosely term “comprehensive statutes”—
legislative fiats that establish a cause of action for minority 
business owner oppression and, in broad strokes, describe the 
behavior that triggers such a cause of action.21 Finally, the 
Delaware Supreme Court, a bellwether of corporate law, has 
declined to create a judicially imposed doctrine of shareholder 
oppression for closely held corporations, stating that it is the 
legislature’s role to create such a policy.22 
With the exception of Delaware and the few states23 that 
appear to follow Delaware’s hands-off approach, the varied 
state regimes have begun to converge over the past quarter 
century.24 First, the majority rule is now that closely held cor-
poration shareholders owe fiduciary duties directly to one an-
other,25 and that a breach of these duties results in actionable 
 
sion but still permit at least some kind of minority shareholder action. See in-
fra Appendix. The two broad subgroups within this category are those that 
permit dissolution on a showing of “illegality” and “fraud,” designated in the 
Appendix as “I&F,” and those that permit dissolution only for deadlock. Three 
additional states have dissolution statutes that create no cause of action for a 
minority shareholder. See id. 
 20. For ease of reference, this Article generally refers to both groups as 
“common law states.” For obvious reasons, the term is not ideal. Many of these 
states are “statutory” to the extent that oppression is specifically enumerated 
as a ground for dissolution. The statutes involved, however, are so barebones 
as to require judicial elaboration and explanation akin to development of com-
mon law doctrine. These states are therefore classified with those states whose 
doctrinal development of the oppression concept and its remedies is purely a 
judicial common law creation. 
 21. For purposes of this Article, these jurisdictions are called “statutory 
states.” See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-1(1)(a), (c) (West 2003) (providing 
ways in which a corporation may be dissolved). 
 22. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1377 (Del. 1993). 
 23. Like Delaware, Kansas and Oklahoma provide no statutory grounds 
for dissolution except where the corporation has two shareholders, each of 
whom owns fifty percent of the shares. See Thompson, supra note 15, at 711 
n.70; infra Appendix. 
 24. But see Karjala, supra note 14, at 701–02 (arguing that close-
corporation regimes are a “motley array” and that uniformity is unlikely be-
cause no “‘Delaware’ of close corporation law” has emerged). 
 25. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 
1975) (“Just as in a partnership, the relationship among the stockholders must 
be one of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty if the enterprise is to suc-
ceed.”); James M. Van Vliet Jr. & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary 
Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 
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conduct, usually described as minority oppression. Second, an 
increasing number of states have adopted the view that the ma-
jority shareholder has oppressed the minority when the major-
ity’s actions violate the minority shareholder’s “reasonable ex-
pectations”26—the broadest definition of oppression, focusing 
not on the actions of the majority shareholder but on the expec-
tations held by the minority shareholder when he or she be-
came an owner.27 Finally, most states now permit courts to im-
pose remedies less drastic than dissolution—a trend that favors 
minority shareholders.28 
According to our survey, a total of twenty states apply the 
reasonable expectations standard,29 and one additional state30 
uses reasonable expectations as a factor. Twelve states have 
adopted a fiduciary duty approach that, for the most part, is 
expansive and could be employed to reach the same result as 
the reasonable expectations standard.31 A buyout of the com-
 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 239, 251–52 (1998) (stating that an emergent general rule 
imposes heightened duties on a close-corporation shareholder). But see Mary 
Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 
381–82 & nn.19–20 (2004) (recognizing that fiduciary duties in close corpora-
tions are the majority rule and that many states have not squarely addressed 
the issue). 
 26. See infra Appendix; see also, e.g., Berreman v. W. Publ’g Co., 615 
N.W.2d 362, 374 (Minn. 2000).  
 27. How much more protection does a shareholder get under the reason-
able expectations model than under the fiduciary duty approach? That is an 
important but probably unanswerable question. See Vaaler, supra note 14, at 
1405–06 (arguing that plaintiffs need only state a claim under the most liberal 
theory; if the claim meets the most permissive theory of liability, the court 
may never reach the merits on the more narrow standard). One would expect 
that “reasonable expectations” are most likely triggered when employment is 
terminated, but termination can also represent a breach of the majority’s fidu-
ciary duty. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663–
64 (Mass. 1976). 
 28. 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMP-
SON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS § 9:30 (2004) (“The most dramatic 
change in legislative and judicial thinking on solutions for close corporation 
problems is reflected in the increased popularity of a buyout as a remedy for 
deadlock or dissension. Legislative or judicial support for this remedy now ex-
ists in most states, although the criteria for its use are not uniform.” (emphasis 
added)). As a practical matter, less drastic remedies make it easier for courts 
to find that oppression has occurred. See infra Part II.B. 
 29. See infra Appendix. 
 30. Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 264 (S.C. 
2001) (creating a standard where reasonable expectations are only a factor); 
see also infra Appendix at “South Carolina.”  
 31. See infra Appendix. But see Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 170 
(Miss. 1989) (requiring the majority to be “intrinsically fair” to the minority); 
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plaining shareholder’s shares is also the rule in eighty percent 
of the states: about forty states provide this remedy, either 
through statute or through common law.32 
Convergence, however, is not uniformity. While states may 
be converging around two or three important principles, they 
have not settled on a single approach or even a handful of ap-
proaches. Importantly, the State of Delaware appears to be 
charting a different course, suggesting that the typical pattern 
in corporate law—where Delaware leads and most other states 
coalesce around that standard—has broken down. Moreover, all 
of these shareholder disputes are intensely fact-driven (and, of 
course, equitable in nature). The difference between the com-
peting standards of liability is not entirely clear. While a com-
plete review of the development of shareholder oppression doc-
trine exceeds the scope of this Article, some background is 
necessary to understand why states have developed such varied 
(yet remedially convergent) regimes. 
A. THE STATUTORY APPROACH 
1. Expanding the Definition of Oppression 
In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, several states, most no-
tably New Jersey, enacted statutes that attempted to codify a 
cause of action for shareholder oppression. While these states 
were (correctly) described as trailblazers, they were not the 
first to make oppression a statutory predicate for dissolution. 
Illinois and Pennsylvania established oppression as a ground 
for dissolution in their statutes in 1933.33 These early statutory 
efforts, however, did not define oppression or enumerate all the 
potential remedies, leaving large gaps for courts to fill.34 Thus, 
the effort by the New Jersey legislature to draft a broad statute 
to govern shareholder oppression, while not exactly new, was 
novel in its scope. And while only a handful of states directly 
 
infra Appendix at “Mississippi.” 
 32. See infra Appendix. 
 33. See Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45, 49 (Ill. 1957) 
(describing the state’s early law); Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effec-
tive Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact upon Valuation of Mi-
nority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 455 (1990) (discussing the devel-
opment of minority shareholder remedies in Illinois, among other 
jurisdictions); Thompson, supra note 15, at 709–11, 713 n.84 (discussing the 
early development of oppression in state statutes and noting that California 
law used the term “persistent unfairness” from 1931 to 1933). 
 34. See Thompson, supra note 15, at 711. 
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followed New Jersey’s lead to adopt expansive statutes,35 the 
legislation nevertheless has proven highly influential. The New 
Jersey legislation added momentum to the idea that minority 
shareholders in closely held corporations require special protec-
tions beyond those afforded to shareholders in larger corpora-
tions. 
The 1972 amendments to the New Jersey General Corpora-
tions Act included several noteworthy provisions.36 First, the 
amendments broadened the court’s available remedies beyond 
dissolution. This expansion was a necessary precondition to ac-
tive judicial intervention in shareholder disputes since many 
judges are unwilling to wield the harsh weapon of dissolution.37 
Second, the statute created a special set of rules for a closely 
held corporation—defined as a corporation with twenty-five or 
fewer shareholders—resulting in a bright-line rule meant to 
prevent abusive strike suits against publicly traded corpora-
tions.38 The statute also clarified that courts may order dissolu-
tion of a closely held corporation on a finding of something less 
than oppression. Actions that are merely unfair can also trigger 
remedies.39 Finally, courts may determine that the majority 
shareholders’ actions are unfair if they are unfair toward the 
minority owner in any of four roles she may play within the 
corporation: shareholder, director, officer, or employee.40 Ac-
cording to the Commissioners’ Comments, 
These additional words reflect the fact that in a closely held corpora-
tion oppressive conduct often takes the form of freezing-out a minor-
ity shareholder by removing him from his various offices or by sub-
stantially diminishing his power or compensation; in the absence of 
 
 35. See infra notes 42–60 and accompanying text. 
 36.  
The Superior Court . . . may appoint a custodian, appoint a provi-
sional director, order a sale of the corporation’s stock as provided be-
low, or enter a judgment dissolving the corporation, upon proof that
. . . in the case of a corporation having 25 or less shareholders, the di-
rectors or those in control have acted fraudulently or illegally, mis-
managed the corporation, or abused their authority as officers or di-
rectors or have acted oppressively or unfairly toward one or more 
minority shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, 
officers, or employees. 
New Jersey Business Corporation Act, ch. 366, 1973 N.J. Laws 964, 1037 
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c) (West 2003)). 
 37. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 cmt. (1972 Amendments). 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. § 14A:12-7(1)(c). 
 40. Id. 
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such language, the courts might feel constrained to look exclusively to 
direct injury to the shareholder’s stock interest.41 
Hence, the new statute decidedly shifted the scales in favor of 
unhappy minority shareholders. 
Three years later, the California legislature amended its 
General Corporation Law to explicitly give shareholders in 
closely held corporations, defined as having thirty-five or fewer 
shareholders, legal grounds to dissolve the corporation.42 Under 
the statute, the court may dissolve a corporation when “[t]hose 
in control of the corporation have been guilty of or have know-
ingly countenanced persistent and pervasive fraud, misman-
agement or abuse of authority or persistent unfairness towards 
any shareholders.”43 The statute generally limits the power to 
bring a dissolution action to members of the board and to 
shareholders holding at least one-third of the corporation’s 
stock, but waives those limitations for closely held corporation 
shareholders:44 grounds for dissolution exist when, “[i]n the 
case of any corporation with 35 or fewer shareholders. . . . , liq-
uidation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights 
or interests of the complaining shareholder or shareholders.”45 
As the Legislative Committee Comment explained: 
Authority to initiate a proceeding for involuntary dissolution is ex-
panded and expressly includes any shareholder, of record or benefi-
cial, of a close corporation. The grounds to justify an involuntary dis-
solution include, in the case of a corporation with 35 or fewer 
shareholders, that such action is reasonably necessary to protect the 
interests of the initiating party.46 
Neither statute expressly adopted the permissive “reason-
able expectations” doctrine as a constraint on oppressive behav-
ior. The California Court of Appeals subsequently rebuffed an 
invitation to construe the statute as encompassing the “reason-
able expectations” of the minority shareholder.47 New Jersey 
 
 41. Id. cmt. (1972 Amendments) (citing ERNEST L. FOLK, REVIEW OF THE 
DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 344 (1968)). 
 42. Act effective Jan. 1, 1977, ch. 683, 1975 Cal. Stat. 1514, 1597–98 (codi-
fied as amended at CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West 1990)). 
 43. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4). 
 44. See id. § 1800(a)(2) (providing shareholders the ability to involuntarily 
dissolve a corporation if they have one-third of the total outstanding shares, 
one-third of the outstanding common shares and equity of the corporation, or 
if they are shareholders in a close corporation). 
 45. Id. § 1800(b)(5). 
 46. Id. § 1800 cmt. (emphasis added). 
 47. Bauer v. Bauer, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 382 (Ct. App. 1996) (“Nothing in 
subdivision (b)(4) would make a cause of action for dissolution turn on the mi-
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courts, by contrast, have concluded that a violation of its stat-
ute can be found when the majority shareholders of a closely 
held corporation defeat the reasonable expectations of the mi-
nority shareholder.48 Under either regime, however, minority 
shareholders in a closely held corporation enjoy a much lower 
threshold for prevailing against the majority shareholders than 
they had previously.49 These statutes in turn influenced other 
states that enacted similar legislation. 
In 1981, Minnesota adopted a new business corporations 
act50 that included a dissolution provision patterned in part on 
the New Jersey statute.51 The first version was intended to as-
sist minority shareholders; in subsequent amendments over the 
following two years, the legislature made the statute still more 
favorable to this ownership group. It lowered the threshold for 
court intervention from “persistently unfair” behavior to merely 
“unfairly prejudicial” behavior—a change intended to broaden 
the law.52 It also added language stating that courts, in consid-
ering whether to grant equitable relief to a shareholder of a 
closely held corporation, should consider the “reasonable expec-
tations of the shareholders.”53 In 1985, North Dakota passed an 
 
nority shareholders’ ‘reasonable expectations.’”). 
 48. Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1029 (N.J. 1993) (“Courts also 
should consider whether the misconduct thwarts the minority shareholder’s 
reasonable expectations of his or her role in the corporation.”); Exadaktilos v. 
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) 
(applying the reasonable expectations doctrine). 
 49. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800 cmt. (“[T]his section states a relatively broad 
ground for involuntary dissolution proceedings. [The provision] is limited to 
corporations with 35 or fewer shareholders . . . .”). The different outcomes in 
California and New Jersey might be explained by differences in the statutory 
language. Compare § 1800(b)(4) (using specific language of “persistent unfair-
ness”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c) (West 2003) (using broader lan-
guage of “oppressively or unfairly”). 
 50. Minnesota Business Corporations Act, ch. 270, 1981 Minn. Laws 1141, 
1213 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2004)). 
 51. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 & note (West 2004) (observing that the 
subdivision permitting the court to order a share buyout was “derived from a 
. . . provision in the New Jersey law”) (Reporter’s Notes—1981). 
 52. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 note (Reporter’s Notes—1982 to 1984). 
This is a more liberal rule than “persistently unfair,” which required 
repeated adverse results before a shareholder could sue. Now only one 
instance is required. Moreover, the law now takes into account the 
treatment of the shareholder in ways outside traditional shareholder 
rights, i.e., the right to ownership. That is, it includes, for example, 
the discharge of a shareholder-employee as a ground, if that discharge 
was “unfairly prejudicial.” 
Id. 
 53. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subdiv. 3a. The wording of this section was 
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involuntary dissolution statute54 that has provisions similar to 
those in the New Jersey and Minnesota statutes.55 Like Minne-
sota’s law, the North Dakota statute requires courts to consider 
the “reasonable expectations of the shareholders.”56 In 1988, 
Alaska passed its own expanded dissolution statute.57 Though 
the statute does not require the courts to consider the reason-
able expectations of the shareholders,58 the Alaska Supreme 
Court had already given its approval of the reasonable expecta-
tions approach in defining oppression under a predecessor 
statute.59 Oregon joined this list in 2001 by amending its corpo-
rate statute.60 
 
later altered. See infra note 74. 
 54. North Dakota Business Corporation Act, ch. 147, § 3, 1985 N.D. Laws 
411–13 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (2005)). 
 55. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(1)(b)(3) (permitting dissolution in 
an action by a shareholder when “[t]he directors or those in control of the cor-
poration have acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more 
shareholders in their capacities as shareholders or directors of a corporation 
that is not a publicly held corporation or as officers or employees of a closely 
held corporation”). 
 56. Id. § 10-19.1-115(4). 
 57. Act of June 17, 1988, ch. 166, § 1, 1988 Alaska Sess. Laws 105–07 
(codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628 (2004)). 
 58. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(5) (permitting dissolution for corpo-
rations with thirty-five or fewer shareholders when “liquidation is reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining share-
holder or shareholders”). 
 59. Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985). 
 60. In 1999, an Oregon attorney who was a party to a bitter, intra-family 
business dispute submitted a proposal to legislators to expand the rights of 
minority shareholders in close corporations. Under the proposed legislation, a 
minority shareholder would have a cause of action if his or her reasonable ex-
pectations were frustrated. Jeff Garrett, Comment, The Reasonable Expecta-
tion Doctrine and Senate Bill 546: Toward a Bright-Line Rule for Corporate 
Oppression in Close Corporations, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 361, 361–63 (2000) 
(providing an overview of the dispute and the associated legal issues); see also 
OR. REV. STAT. § 60.952(2) (2003) (setting out remedies for shareholders of a 
close corporation); Naito v. Naito, 35 P.3d 1068, 1070–77 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) 
(describing the facts of the case that prompted the legislation). 
The controversial legislation was tabled for that session, but in 2001 the 
Oregon legislature adopted an expanded buyout provision for shareholders in 
close corporations that includes the reasonable expectations language. See Act 
of June 5, 2001, ch. 316, § 58, 2001 Or. Laws 761 (codified as amended at OR. 
REV. STAT. § 60.661(2)). The statute limits the traditional dissolution statute 
to publicly traded corporations. See OR. REV. STAT. § 60.661(2)(b). Sharehold-
ers in close corporations—i.e., “a corporation that does not have shares that 
are listed on a national securities exchange or that are regularly traded in a 
market maintained by one or more members of a national or affiliated securi-
ties association”—are permitted to seek remedies. Id. § 60.952 (providing that 
to determine the appropriate remedy, “the court may take into consideration 
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2. Expanding the Range of Remedies 
In addition to providing a more expansive definition of “op-
pressively,” the New Jersey statute contained another impor-
tant innovation: the statute made clear that the state’s courts 
can impose a range of equitable remedies when a minority 
shareholder proves that the majority has acted “unfairly.”61 The 
significance of this change cannot be underestimated. By per-
mitting courts to provide lesser equitable remedies, especially a 
buyout, the New Jersey legislature made it easier for the mi-
nority shareholder to prevail on the underlying claim. Although 
as a theoretical matter the determination of whether a minority 
shareholder has been oppressed involves an inquiry separate 
from what remedy is appropriate, as a practical matter the 
harshness of the remedy inevitably plays a role in the initial 
finding of oppression. That is, there is a causal connection be-
tween the range of permissible remedies and the explosion of 
litigation initiated under the section.62 
The Minnesota legislature was even more direct when it 
enacted Section 302A.751, which permits a court to dissolve the 
business or to “grant any equitable relief it deems just and rea-
sonable in the circumstances.”63 The 1981 Reporter’s Notes 
clarify that the less severe equitable remedies call for a lower 
standard for finding that the controlling persons 
acted fraudulently, illegally, or in a manner persistently unfair to a 
non-controlling shareholder. Although similar words appear in [the 
predecessor statute], the new provision should be interpreted in a 
more liberal manner. In view of the power of the court to order lesser 
equitable relief, the threshold of “persistent unfairness” required for a 
lesser remedy should be proportionately less than the stringent stan-
dards which are required, quite properly, for the ultimate relief of 
dissolution.64 
Thus, the section appears to create a kind of sliding scale of op-
 
the reasonable expectations of the corporation’s shareholders as they existed 
at the time the corporation was formed and developed during the course of the 
shareholders’ relationship with the corporation and with each other”). 
 61. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c) (2003). 
 62. Eileen A. Lindsay, What Can I Do for You? Remedies for Oppressed 
Shareholders in New Jersey, N.J. LAW., Aug. 2000, at 37, 37 (“Because of the 
availability of various forms of relief, the increase in the number of oppressed 
shareholder cases being brought each year has been ‘phenomenal.’” (quoting 
Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a 
Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 26 (1987))). 
 63. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 64. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751, note (West 2004) (Reporter’s Notes—
1981). 
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pression: the level of “persistent unfairness” required for a 
mere buyout is lower than the level of “persistent unfairness” 
for dissolution. One can certainly criticize this approach as add-
ing subjectivity to an already subjective standard, but the vir-
tue of this standard may be that it makes explicit what almost 
certainly happens, without explanation, in any state that per-
mits a range of equitable remedies in addition to dissolution. 
Other statutory regimes also permit remedies less drastic 
than dissolution when the majority shareholders oppress the 
minority. Alaska permits majority shareholders to avoid invol-
untary dissolution by purchasing the shares of the complaining 
shareholder.65 In addition, Alaska has followed the line of cases 
in common law states by permitting a full range of equitable 
remedies as alternatives to dissolution.66 California, too, has 
provided that majority shareholders can avoid involuntary dis-
solution through a buyout at fair value.67 
3. Criticism and Development 
Critics have urged that the statutory approach sets the bar 
too low for plaintiffs, leading to needless litigation and to un-
predictable, unfair decisions.68 The complaints are not without 
merit. There is certainly case law to suggest that states with a 
statutory scheme have expanded the meaning of oppression be-
yond what the legislatures had probably intended. 
In Minnesota, for example, case law began to suggest that 
a minority shareholder who was also employed by the corpora-
tion simply could not be fired. Stated another way, it appeared 
from the cases that terminating a shareholder-employee was a 
per se breach of his or her reasonable expectations. In Pedro v. 
Pedro (Pedro II), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that 
when two brothers in a luggage manufacturing business termi-
nated a third brother, they breached his reasonable expectation 
to lifetime employment.69 The court emphasized the unusual 
facts of the case: the plaintiff had been an employee for forty-
five years and the majority owners fired him at the age of sixty-
 
 65. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.630(a) (2004). 
 66. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 67. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000(a) (1990) (providing that the corporation it-
self has the first right to purchase the shares from the complaining share-
holder). 
 68. See, e.g., Vaaler, supra note 14, at 1383. 
 69. 489 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
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two after he had uncovered serious accounting irregularities.70 
While the facts could have easily supported a claim of oppres-
sion triggering a buyout of the shares, the court in Pedro II 
went much further and held that the majority also violated the 
plaintiff ’s second interest as an employee, and that he could 
thus recover separately for lost future wages.71 Two years later, 
the same court found that a terminated minority shareholder 
had a reasonable expectation to continued employment and was 
entitled to equitable relief, even though the shareholder 
pleaded guilty to assault while acting within the scope of his 
employment and, just prior to his termination, had assaulted 
one of the other shareholders.72 
Corporate practitioners became concerned that a minority 
shareholder could never be fired, no matter how marginal his 
or her performance.73 The implication of critics was clear: 
statutory states had gotten it wrong, and common law states 
had struck the narrower and more appropriate balance. Two 
trends have undermined the assumption that statutory states 
and most common law states are following starkly different 
paths, however. 
First, legislative efforts in statutory states have narrowed 
somewhat the scope of the statutes. In 1994, for example, the 
Minnesota legislature amended Section 751 in two ways that 
responded to decisions like Pedro II: first, by making clear that 
the relief should be granted after considering the “reasonable 
expectations of all shareholders”;74 and second, by adding lan-
guage indicating that written agreements—including buy-sell 
 
 70. Id. at 799–800. In addition to the long period of service, the court 
noted that the majority owners threatened Alfred with termination unless he 
agreed to ignore the discrepancy. Id. at 800. After his firing, the majority own-
ers told employees that he had had a nervous breakdown. Id. 
 71. Id. at 803. The court of appeals rejected a claim that once the buyout 
of the shares was complete, the former shareholder could not have a right to 
lost wages. Id. “We believe the trial court’s award of future damages for lost 
wages is wholly consistent with the court’s broad equitable powers found in 
§ 302A.751, subdiv. 3a and is warranted based upon its finding of a contract 
for lifetime employment.” Id. 
 72. Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834, 836–37 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1994). 
 73. See Vaaler, supra note 14 passim (criticizing several aspects of Minne-
sota’s corporation act, particularly Section 302A.751). But see Philip S. Garon 
et al., Challenging Delaware’s Desirability as a Haven for Incorporation, 32 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 769, 795–98 (2006) (rejecting Vaaler’s general argu-
ments but admitting that Section 751 lacks clarity). 
 74. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subdiv. 3a (2004) (emphasis added). The pre-
vious version did not include the word “all.” 
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agreements—should be presumed to reflect the parties’ reason-
able expectations.75 In addition, Minnesota court decisions have 
placed further judicial limits on determinations that a termina-
tion violates the “reasonable expectations” of the shareholder. 
In Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Professionals, the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff claiming that ter-
mination violated a reasonable expectation of continued em-
ployment must surmount two threshold elements and a 
balancing test.76 Courts have also raised some procedural 
bars.77 
Other statutory states have imposed more modest refine-
ments and limitations. California courts, for example, declined 
to construe the term “persistent unfairness” as representing a 
breach of the reasonable expectations of the shareholder.78 The 
New Jersey legislature amended its statute in 1988 to make 
the terms of a court-ordered buyout less onerous on the party 
purchasing the shares.79 Under previous law, the buyer had to 
pay cash within thirty days.80 Under the new law, the buyer 
can pay over a longer period of time and use cash, notes or 
other property.81 
A second trend, discussed in the next section, also under-
mines the assumption that statutory states and common law 
states are still following different paths. At the same time that 
 
 75. The statute now states: “For purposes of this section, any written 
agreements, including employment agreements and buy-sell agreements, be-
tween or among shareholders or between or among one or more shareholders 
and the corporation are presumed to reflect the parties’ reasonable expecta-
tions concerning matters dealt with in the agreements.” Id.  
 76. 628 N.W.2d 173, 190–92 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 77. See Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 467–68 (Minn. 1999) 
(holding that allegations of waste and misappropriation are injuries to the cor-
poration and thus are derivative claims requiring the plaintiff to conform to 
MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.09). 
 78. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 79. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 cmt. (West 2003) (Commissioners’ 
Comments—1988 Amendments). 
The Commissioner was concerned that Section 14A:12-7 is not operat-
ing as effectively as it might to assist in the resolution of internal dis-
putes because of the existing limitations that only a plaintiff ’s shares 
may be mandatorily purchased at fair value and that the purchase 
price must be paid all in cash. 
Id. 
 80. New Jersey Business Corporation Act, ch. 94, § 69, 1988 N.J. Laws 
751–55 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (taking effect Dec. 
1, 1988). 
 81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(e). 
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many statutory states started to impose some restrictions on 
the scope of the law—both through amendments and through 
case law—many of the common law states began to adopt fairly 
broad definitions of what constitutes oppression. In fact, many 
state courts adopted the permissive reasonable expectations 
model, just as states like Minnesota, New Jersey, and North 
Dakota have. One act by the majority shareholders that con-
travenes the reasonable expectations of the minority owner pro-
vides the predicate for the remedy of business separation 
through the buyout mechanism. 
B. COMMON LAW STATES 
1. Expanding the Notion of Oppression 
In early shareholder dispute cases, some courts responded 
to the complaints of minority shareholders in closely held cor-
porations by permitting dissolution of the corporation—but 
only when the majority shareholder’s unscrupulous behavior 
was particularly extreme.82 “The traditional rule was that 
courts lack power to dissolve a solvent corporation absent a 
statute. Yet even before statutes specifically granted courts 
power to dissolve corporations or provide other remedies, courts 
recognized broad exceptions to the rule.”83 However, because 
dissolution is a harsh remedy, courts imposed it only when the 
actions of the majority were egregious—effectively barring re-
lief for many minority shareholders.84 
Later, courts became somewhat more sympathetic to mi-
nority claims. One commentator suggests that the changes 
came in “three distinct stages”: 
Oppression began its life . . . primarily as a means of assuring that 
the drastic dissolution remedy was employed only in egregious situa-
tions in which it was truly warranted. In the second stage, the op-
pression concept came to be applied more as a substantive wrong that 
including conduct essentially amounting to breach of the controlling 
shareholders’ fiduciary duties . . . . The analysis in the third stage fo-
cused not on the wrongful conduct of the controlling shareholder, but 
on whether the controlling shareholder’s governance of the corpora-
tion fulfilled the non-controlling shareholder’s reasonable expecta-
tions for his participation in the corporation.85 
 
 82. See Storm, supra note 14, at 388–89. 
 83. 2 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 28, § 7:10. 
 84. Id. § 7:10 n.3. 
 85. Storm, supra note 14, at 388–89. The author observed that, in Illinois, 
the seminal cases of the first phase were decided in the mid-1950s; the second 
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Each new phase broadened the rights of the minority share-
holder. 
Courts have settled on three primary approaches.86 First, 
the earliest and narrowest approach required egregious 
breaches on the part of the majority shareholders, sometimes 
requiring a showing that “corporate ruin” would likely result87 
or at least something very serious but short of corporate disas-
ter.88 Second, the fiduciary-duty approach generally expanded 
the range of behavior that could be seen as oppressive. Under 
this approach, courts analogized that the closely held corpora-
tion is essentially a partnership clothed in corporate form and 
that shareholders owe a similar duty. Since a majority share-
holder could breach a partnership-type fiduciary duty without 
bringing the corporation to the brink of ruin, this approach 
broadened the earliest standard. The final standard, reason-
able expectations, is broader still, focusing not on whether the 
acts of the majority shareholder breached a duty but rather on 
whether the minority shareholder’s expectations were frus-
trated.89 
Not all states, of course, have moved to the third and most 
permissive approach. What is apparent, however, is that start-
ing in the 1970s and 1980s, states struggled to strike the right 
balance between the interests of minority and majority share-
holders. In doing so, many states (though certainly not all) 
struck that balance in favor of minority shareholders. 
 
phase can be discerned fairly clearly by 1980; and the final phase began (offi-
cially) in 1983 when legislators included “reasonable expectations” language in 
its state corporation law. Id. at 393, 405, 421. 
 86. See Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Con-
tracts: Is the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 
1001–02 (2001) [hereinafter Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact 
Contracts]. 
 87. See, e.g., Barnett v. Int’l Tennis Corp., 263 N.W.2d 908, 918 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1978). Dissolution is a last resort remedy and is thus “necessary to prove 
exceptional circumstances before dissolution will be ordered.” Id. “[Exceptional 
circumstances] include financial loss, corporate paralysis, mismanagement 
and deterioration of property. The ultimate test is whether corporate ruin will 
inevitably follow continuance of present management.” Id. (citing Stott Realty 
Co. v. Orloff, 247 N.W. 698, 699 (Mich. 1933); Levent v. Kowal, 86 N.W.2d 336, 
341 (Mich. 1957)). 
 88. See Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45, 50 (Ill. 1957) 
(“The word ‘oppressive’ does not carry an essential inference of imminent dis-
aster; it can, we think, contemplate a continuing course of conduct.”). 
 89. See Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts, supra 
note 86, at 1002. 
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2. Embracing Reasonable Expectations 
The reasonable expectations model of shareholder oppres-
sion arguably had its genesis in two common law states: Mas-
sachusetts and New York. The Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts in 1976 held in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 
Inc. that the controlling shareholders breached their fiduciary 
duty to a minority shareholder by firing him from his job for no 
legitimate reason.90 While the court in Wilkes did not explicitly 
use the words “reasonable expectations,” it focused much of its 
attention on the frustration of the minority owner’s interests 
from the point of view of the minority shareholder. Discussing 
generally the fact that minority shareholders are frequently 
dependent on their jobs and receive constructive dividends in 
the form of salary, the court noted, “In sum, by terminating a 
minority stockholder’s employment or by severing him from a 
position as an officer or director, the majority effectively frus-
trate[d] the minority stockholder’s purposes in entering on the 
corporate venture and also den[ied] him an equal return on his 
investment.”91 Elsewhere in the opinion, the court observed 
that “Wilkes was one of the four originators of the nursing 
home venture; and that Wilkes, like the others, had invested 
his capital and time for more than fifteen years with the expec-
tation that he would continue to participate in corporate deci-
sions.”92 The language foreshadows the explicit reasonable ex-
pectations approach, which focuses not on the wrongful acts of 
the majority shareholder but rather on what the minority 
shareholder thought she had bargained for and received. 
Four years later, a Supreme Court of New York explicitly 
applied the “reasonable expectations” approach to decide 
whether a corporation that owned Manhattan pharmacies 
should be dissolved after two shareholders ousted a third, who 
had moved from another state to join the business.93 The court 
in In re Topper drew the language from a passage in a law re-
view article by Professor F. Hodge O’Neal: 
Many participants in closely held corporations are “little people”, un-
sophisticated in business and financial matters. Not uncommonly a 
participant in a closely held enterprise invests all his assets in the 
business with an expectation, often reasonable under the circum-
stances even in the absence of an express contract, that he will be a 
 
 90. 353 N.E.2d 657, 664–65 (Mass. 1976). 
 91. Id. at 662–63 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 664 (emphasis added). 
 93. In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 ( Sup. Ct. 1980). 
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key employee in the company and will have a voice in business deci-
sions.94 
Under this approach, a court could find oppression by fo-
cusing on how the actions of the majority interfered with what 
the minority shareholder reasonably expected would happen 
when she invested in and joined the enterprise. The reasoning 
in Topper struck a chord with courts in other states. The Su-
preme Court of Montana in 1982, citing Topper and the article 
by Professor O’Neal, held that an “oppressive” act within the 
meaning of the state’s dissolution statute could be interpreted 
by examining the reasonable expectations of the minority 
shareholder.95 In 1983, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 
citing the same authorities, held that reasonable expectations 
could be used to interpret its (broader) dissolution statute.96 
In 1984, the Court of Appeals of New York put its stamp of 
approval on the “reasonable expectations” doctrine in In re 
Kemp & Beatley, Inc.97 The state’s high court, citing Topper, 
provided extensive analysis. The court explained that the 
shareholder who “reasonably expected that ownership in the 
corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of corpo-
rate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other 
form of security” would be oppressed “in a very real sense when 
others in the corporation seek to defeat those expectations.”98 
Courts applying the reasonable expectations model “must in-
vestigate what the majority shareholders knew, or should have 
known, to be the petitioner’s expectations in entering the par-
ticular enterprise.”99 The court imposed limits on the doctrine, 
noting that oppression does not arise simply because a party’s 
“subjective hopes and desires” went unfulfilled. Rather, the ma-
jority behavior must “substantially defeat[] expectations that, 
objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circum-
 
 94. Id. at 365 (quoting F. Hodge O’Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Leg-
islation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. LAW. 873, 884 (1978)) (emphasis 
added). 
 95. Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 933 (Mont. 1982).  
 96. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 561–63 (N.C. 1983) (con-
struing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1975) (current version at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 55-14-30(2) (2005)) (permitting courts to act when “[l]iquidation is rea-
sonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complain-
ing shareholder”)). 
 97. 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (1984). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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stances and were central to the petitioner’s decision to join the 
venture.”100 
The Kemp decision proved, in the words of one commenta-
tor, “particularly influential.”101 In some states with dissolution 
statutes in the mold of the Model Business Corporation Act, 
courts concluded that the reasonable expectations doctrine pro-
vided a useful gloss on what the term oppression meant. In 
1987, for example, the Supreme Court of North Dakota cited 
the case approvingly and adopted its reasoning in construing 
the term oppression in the Model Business Corporations Act.102 
In Davis v. Sheerin, the Court of Appeals of Texas looked to de-
cisions of other states, including New York, to give meaning to 
the term oppression as used in the Texas Business Corporation 
Act: “The New York court in Wiedy’s held that oppression 
should be deemed to arise only when the majority’s conduct 
substantially defeats the expectations that objectively viewed 
were both reasonable under the circumstances and were cen-
tral to the minority shareholder’s decision to join the ven-
ture.”103 Applying the New York standard, the Texas Court of 
Appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the majority 
shareholders had engaged in oppressive conduct.104 In the same 
year, the Iowa Court of Appeals reached a similar decision.105 
The New York decision, coming full circle, influenced New Jer-
sey, the first state with a comprehensive statute.106 
 
 100. Id. The New York Court of Appeals did not cite Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 
at 551, but both courts reached similar conclusions that mere subjective hopes 
are not “reasonable” expectations. Compare In re Kemp & Beatley, 484 
N.Y.S.2d at 799, 805 (“Majority conduct should not be deemed oppressive sim-
ply because the petitioner’s subjective hopes and desires in joining the venture 
are not fulfilled.”), with Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563 (“The key is ‘reasonable.’ 
In order for plaintiff ’s expectations to be reasonable, they must be known to or 
assumed by the other shareholders and concurred in by them.”). 
 101. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: 
Of Change, Gifts, and Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 717, 717 (2002). 
 102. Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987). Although at the 
time of the decision North Dakota had adopted new, more expansive legisla-
tion, the court was applying the state’s version of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act because the corporation had not opted into the new scheme. See id. at 
385 n.2. 
 103. 754 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App. 1988) (citing In re Wiedy’s Furniture 
Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (App. Div. 1985)). 
 104. Id. at 383. 
 105. Maschmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377, 379–81 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 1988). 
 106. See supra note 48. 
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While the reasonable expectations model may not yet fully 
represent a majority rule, courts in at least twenty-one states 
have applied the language in some form.107 Courts in several 
states have adopted the reasonable expectations test without 
“enabling” language from the statute itself; that is, courts have 
applied the test even when the statute only provides that disso-
lution is available when conduct is “oppressive.”108 Thus, Pro-
fessor Moll is correct when he states that, of the three main ap-
proaches to oppression, “the ‘reasonable expectations’ standard 
garners the most approval, and courts have increasingly used it 
to determine whether oppressive conduct has taken place.”109 
3. Expanding the Range of Remedies 
A number of common law states also followed a path paral-
lel to the one taken by statutory states by concluding that their 
courts have broad powers to impose a range of equitable reme-
dies when the majority shareholder acts oppressively. As al-
ready noted, the power to impose remedies less drastic than 
dissolution serves the interests of minority shareholders in a 
dispute.110 When the only option is to dissolve the (often suc-
cessful) corporation, with the inevitable effect on employees, 
customers, and suppliers, judges are likely to require a very 
substantial showing of oppression. If the remedy is the less-
onerous buyout, courts can countenance a weaker showing of 
oppression. Courts in statutory states could often point to pro-
visions in the statute for authority to take less drastic meas-
ures. Courts in many common law states, by contrast, generally 
 
 107. See infra Appendix. 
 108. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in declining to adopt the reason-
able expectations test, stated that “no court has adopted the reasonable expec-
tations test without the assistance of a statute.” Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. 
& Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 265 (S.C. 2001) (citing Ralph A. Peeples, The 
Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 505 (1985)). Assuming that a narrow dissolution 
statute does not qualify as “assistance of a statute,” this statement is no longer 
true. Arkansas, Colorado, and Iowa, for example, all have narrow dissolution 
statutes and all have adopted the reasonable expectations test. See infra Ap-
pendix. Arguably, Montana, which then had (and still has) a narrow dissolu-
tion statute, applied a version of the reasonable expectations test in 1982. See 
Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 933–34 (Mont. 1982). 
 109. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts, supra 
note 86, at 1002. 
 110. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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have to rely on their inherent equitable powers to provide 
remedies like a court-ordered buyout.111 
The Supreme Court of Oregon made clear in a 1973 case 
that its courts have equitable power to grant relief less drastic 
than dissolution after a minority shareholder proves oppres-
sion.112 The court in Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc. 
reaffirmed an earlier holding that “in a suit [under state stat-
ute] for ‘oppressive’ conduct consisting of a ‘squeeze out’ or 
‘freeze out’ in a ‘close’ corporation the courts are not limited to 
the remedy of dissolution, but may, as an alternative, consider 
other appropriate equitable relief.”113 The Baker court offered a 
list of ten remedies that might be available to the successful 
plaintiff, including the appointment of a “special fiscal agent,” 
the declaration of a dividend, a court-ordered buyout of the mi-
nority’s share, and money damages.114 The decision proved 
highly influential. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska in a 1980 case said that it 
was “persuaded by Baker” that courts, using their inherent eq-
uitable powers, could impose remedies less drastic than disso-
lution in oppression cases.115 The court in Alaska Plastics rec-
ognized that the most effective solution to the dispute would 
likely be liquidity for the minority shareholder—something it 
said could be achieved in only one of four ways: through a pro-
vision in the articles or bylaws of the corporation, through in-
voluntary dissolution, through a right of appraisal after a fun-
damental corporate change, and, finally, through a court-
ordered purchase after a court found a breach of fiduciary 
duty.116 The dissolution remedy, the court observed, can be both 
limited and unfair to all parties: “Liquidation is an extreme 
remedy. In a sense, forced dissolution allows minority share-
 
 111. See, e.g., Bedore v. Familian, 125 P.3d 1168, 1172 (Nev. 2006) 
(“[C]ourts have the power to order corporate ‘buy-outs even in the absence of 
specific statutory authority.’” (quoting Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 472 (5th 
Cir. 2000))). But see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2002), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/library/onlinepublications/mbca2002.pdf (per-
mitting a buyout in lieu of dissolution). 
 112. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395 (Or. 
1973).  
 113. Id. at 395 (citing Browning v. C&C Plywood Corp., 434 P.2d 339, 343 
(Or. 1967)). 
 114. Id. at 395–96. 
 115. Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274–75 (Alaska 1980) 
(citing Baker, 507 P.2d at 396). 
 116. Id. at 274. 
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holders to exercise retaliatory oppression against the majority. 
Absent compelling circumstances, courts often are reluctant to 
order involuntary dissolution.”117 Thus, the Alaska Supreme 
Court concluded that less drastic remedies are available in 
cases of shareholder oppression and quoted with approval the 
passage in Baker that authorized a court-ordered buyout.118 
The Alaska Supreme Court presciently observed that “[f]rom a 
dissatisfied shareholder’s point of view, the most successful 
remedy is likely to be a requirement that the corporation buy 
his or her shares at their fair value.”119 
Most states now permit courts to order either a full range 
of equitable remedies or, at the very least, a court-ordered buy-
out.120 The Court of Appeals of Iowa, for example, quoted all ten 
of the Baker remedies verbatim and held that the district court 
correctly concluded that it could order a remedy less drastic 
than dissolution—in this case, an order to partially liquidate 
the corporation and redeem the plaintiff ’s shares.121 In Balvik 
v. Sylvester, the North Dakota Supreme Court, construing the 
state’s predecessor oppression statute, also quoted verbatim the 
Baker remedies, stating that even though the statute “mentions 
only dissolution as a remedy for oppressive conduct, we agree 
with those courts which have interpreted their similar statu-
tory counterparts to allow alternative equitable remedies not 
specifically stated in the statute.”122 The decision was some-
what narrow, since North Dakota had already enacted new leg-
islation clarifying that a court “may grant any equitable relief 
it deems just and reasonable in the circumstances or may dis-
solve a corporation.”123 But this decision, and the others like it, 
reaffirms the proposition that many common law states over 
the past three decades have embraced additional protections 
for minority shareholders—much like states with comprehen-
sive statutes. 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 274–75. (declining to express an opinion on whether the facts of 
the case established oppression and remanding the case to the trial court). 
 119. Id. at 274. 
 120. 2 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 28, §§ 9:30–:31. The authority to 
order buyouts in some cases is explicitly set out in statute and in other cases 
falls under the court’s equitable powers. See, e.g., id. § 9:30 nn.4–5 (gathering 
statutes). 
 121. Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 274–75 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).  
 122. 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987). 
 123. See id. at 388 n.3 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985) (cur-
rent version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 10-19.1-115 (2005))). 
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Not all states have followed the reasoning in Baker. In 
Giannotti v. Hamway, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed a 
trial court finding that the majority shareholders in a profitable 
nursing home venture had oppressed the minority by paying 
themselves outsized salaries while declaring only modest divi-
dends.124 The trial court ordered dissolution; on appeal, the de-
fendants argued that a “‘corporate death penalty’ should not be 
imposed on a viable, solvent corporation.”125 The Supreme 
Court was unmoved: “The remedy specified by the legislature, 
while discretionary, is ‘exclusive,’ and does not permit the trial 
court to fashion other, apparently equitable remedies.”126 In the 
context of Virginia’s common law on oppression, which contin-
ues to require a very high showing,127 that decision makes 
sense. Since plaintiffs must make a very strong showing to pre-
vail in an oppression claim, the remedy of dissolution is not in-
appropriate. But these views are in the minority. Given the 
wide acceptance of the Baker rationale (and the presence in 
other states of statutes that authorize a buyout), it seems 
unlikely that the Virginia approach will become the majority 
rule.128 Indeed, it would be quite a reversal, since at this point 
about forty states permit buyouts either through statute or 
common law. 
 
 124. 387 S.E.2d 725, 733 (Va. 1990). The Virginia Supreme Court observed 
that between 1975 and 1985, the majority shareholders received compensation 
of $2,799,006 while the minority shareholder plaintiffs received $50,000 of the 
$132,000 in common stock dividends. Id. at 729. Earlier in the company’s his-
tory, the plaintiffs had controlled the corporation through a voting trust, but 
that arrangement was lost in part because of a transaction in which two de-
fendants received 80,000 shares to guarantee a loan to the corporation. Id. at 
728. 
 125. Id. at 733. 
 126. Id. (citing White v. Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (Va. 1972)). 
 127. The court in Giannotti states: 
“oppressive” means conduct by corporate managers toward stockhold-
ers which departs from the standards of fair dealing and violates the 
principles of fair play on which persons who entrust their funds to a 
corporation are entitled to rely. The term does not mean that a corpo-
rate disaster may be imminent and does not necessarily mean fraudu-
lent conduct. 
  . . . . 
The term can contemplate a continuous course of conduct and in-
cludes a lack of probity in corporate affairs to the prejudice of some of 
its shareholders. 
Id. at 730–31 (citing White, 189 S.E.2d at 319–20). 
 128. See generally Haynsworth, supra note 62, at 41 (discussing the avail-
able remedies for dealing with intra-corporate dissension). 
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4. The Delaware Approach 
One might have thought that Delaware, usually a leader in 
corporate law, would have been in the vanguard in shaping the 
shareholder-oppression jurisprudence that arose over the past 
quarter century. However, it was not until 1993—twenty years 
after New Jersey passed its landmark statutes and seventeen 
years after Donahue—that the Delaware Supreme Court 
weighed in on the question of whether minority stockholders in 
a closely held corporation could even state a claim of oppression 
(much less whether that claim is satisfied by the relaxed “rea-
sonable expectations” standard). Bucking the national trend, 
the court in Nixon v. Blackwell held in the negative.129 To grant 
relief not specifically authorized by Delaware statutes would 
“run counter to the spirit of the doctrine of independent legal 
significance, and would be inappropriate judicial legislation.”130 
Neither the delay in rendering a decision nor the ultimate 
result should come as a complete shock, however. As Professor 
Robert Ragazzo has observed, the relatively long delay in ad-
dressing the hot topic can be explained in part by the fact that 
corporate defendants in Delaware courts are frequently pub-
licly held, rather than closely held, corporations.131 The sub-
stantive decision, too, makes sense in light of several factors. 
First, Delaware statutes do not specifically authorize involun-
tary dissolution on a showing of oppression, unlike most states 
(including New York). Second, Delaware does have a special 
section for closely held corporations in its statutes132—albeit a 
provision that requires an affirmative, opt-in decision133 and 
that, by the court’s admission, has not proven popular with 
practitioners.134 Thus, to accept the plaintiff ’s invitation to rec-
 
 129. 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993). 
 130. Id. at 1380–81. 
 131. Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held 
Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1101 (1999). 
 132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341–56 (2001). 
 133. See id. §§ 343–44. 
 134. The Delaware Supreme Court quoted an influential Delaware practice 
guide: 
statutory close corporations have not found particular favor with 
practitioners. Practitioners have for the most part viewed the complex 
statutory provisions underlying the purportedly simplified opera-
tional procedures for close corporations as legal quicksand of uncer-
tain depth and have adopted the view that the objectives sought by 
the subchapter are achievable for their clients with considerably less 
uncertainty by [making appropriate provisions in the charter and by-
laws]. 
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ognize a special rule for closely held corporations, the court in 
Nixon would have had to conclude that a cause of action for op-
pression existed in common law and that this common law 
claim was not preempted by Subchapter XIV of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law. 
Moreover, as a matter of policy, the Delaware Supreme 
Court was no doubt aware that a cause of action for oppression 
generally runs counter to the doctrine of independent legal sig-
nificance, since, in the typical oppression case, the majority 
shareholder has not violated any specific provision in the corpo-
rations statute.135 Concluding that this doctrine does not apply 
in cases involving “closely held corporations” might arguably 
have caused some uncertainty in future cases involving publicly 
traded corporations. It certainly would have required clarifica-
tion of what constitutes a “closely held corporation,” creating 
doubt for large, privately held firms with many shareholders. 
Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court probably recognized that 
many purported stockholder-oppression claims—including the 
claim in Nixon—would still get close judicial review under the 
test for “entire fairness.”136 Typically, Delaware courts review 
corporate decisions under the deferential business judgment 
rule.137 However, as the court in Nixon explained, the entire 
fairness test is implicated when the directors are on both sides 
of the transaction.138 To satisfy entire fairness, defendants have 
the burden of proving both fair dealing and fair price, a de-
manding standard:139 “The entire fairness analysis essentially 
requires ‘judicial scrutiny.’”140 Noting that the standard is often 
(but not always) outcome determinative, the court remanded 
for further consideration.141 
 
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 n.19 (Del. 1993) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 43.01 (1993)). 
 135. One can sense this concern when the court in Nixon observed that it 
“would be inappropriate judicial legislation . . . to fashion a special judicially-
created rule for minority investors when the entity does not fall within those 
statutes, or when there are no negotiated special provisions in the certificate 
of incorporation, by-laws, or stockholder agreements.” Id. at 1380–81. 
 136. Id. at 1376–77. 
 137. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 138. Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1376 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
701, 710 (Del. 1983)). 
 139. Id. (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711). 
 140. Id. (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710). 
 141. Id. at 1381. 
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After Nixon, a minority stockholder has some protection 
from unfair practices by a majority stockholder, but not under 
the banner of oppression. Rather, the minority stockholder 
must argue that the suspect transaction should be judged un-
der the entire fairness test and that, under that test, it fails. 
However, Nixon left many questions open. One question was 
whether a minority stockholder has a claim when the majority 
interferes with her role as an employee. In Riblet Products 
Corp. v. Nagy, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the 
claims of Ernest Nagy, the CEO and minority stockholder of a 
manufacturing corporation who was fired in violation of his 
employment contract.142 Nagy sued in federal district court, 
and a jury awarded him damages both for the breach of the 
employment contract with the company and for the breach of 
fiduciary duties the majority stockholders owed him as a mi-
nority stockholder-employee.143 On a certified question from the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that Nagy did not have a claim in his role as stockholder: 
“We hold that, although majority stockholders have fiduciary 
duties to minority stockholders qua stockholders, those duties 
are not implicated when the issue involves the rights of the mi-
nority stockholder qua employee under an employment con-
tract. The duties of the corporation to the CEO are contrac-
tual.”144 
Professor Ragazzo argues that the Nixon and Riblet Prod-
ucts decisions are not nearly as sweeping as the language 
might indicate.145 He notes that the Seventh Circuit in Riblet 
Products, in deciding to certify the question to the Delaware 
Supreme Court, concluded that Nixon did not control the ques-
tion (a premise not contradicted in the state Supreme Court 
opinion).146 He also argues that the Riblet Products decision is 
a narrow one.147 The question before the court was the extent of 
 
 142. 683 A.2d 37, 38 (Del. 1996). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 37. 
 145. Ragazzo, supra note 131, at 1150–51 (“[D]espite the pronouncement in 
Nixon v. Blackwell that there are no special rules for closely held corporations, 
the death of special shareholder duties in Delaware corporations has been 
greatly exaggerated.”). 
 146. Id. at 1132–33 (discussing the certification process and noting that 
“[t]he Seventh Circuit viewed Ueltzhoeffer v. Fox Fire Development Co. as the 
only relevant Delaware authority”). 
 147. Id. at 1133 (“It is worth noting that the Delaware Supreme Court for-
mulated an extremely narrow question.”). 
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remedies under an existing employment contract. Thus, the 
Delaware Supreme Court did not need to decide what remedy 
might exist, if any, had he been fired without a contract. 
This is not a case of breach of fiduciary duty to Nagy qua stockholder. 
To be sure, the Majority Stockholders may well owe fiduciary duties 
to Nagy as a minority stockholder. But that is not the issue here. 
Nagy does not allege that his termination amounted to a wrongful 
freeze out of his stock interest in Riblet, nor does he contend that he 
was harmed as a stockholder by being terminated.148 
Professor Ragazzo argues further that the narrow holdings 
in Nixon and Riblet Products leave the Delaware courts room to 
decide that the entire fairness test—which is a searching judi-
cial examination—is triggered by more subtle freezeout meth-
ods that in other states would fall under the banner of oppres-
sion.149 If the Delaware courts begin to apply this test to subtle 
freezeouts, as he urges, “the modern course of corporate law 
development will be reversed. Instead of the rest of the country 
following Delaware’s lead, Delaware will have followed the na-
tion’s lead.”150  
Professor Mary Siegel, in response, argues that the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in Nixon and Riblet Products has crafted 
a superior rule and that minority stockholders actually are bet-
ter served by it.151 Moreover, she notes the imposition of part-
nership-like duties makes it unclear when the business judg-
ment rule does not apply, meaning that at times minority 
stockholders cannot vote in their own self interest.152 Siegel 
also argues that the rule in Donahue is not as widely adopted 
as some commentators insist and that the Delaware rule will 
eventually become the dominant one.153 
At this point, however, both Ragazzo and Siegel would 
agree that Delaware has not recognized the doctrine of oppres-
sion in closely held corporations, even if minority interests 
 
 148. Riblet Prods. Corp., 683 A.2d at 40. 
 149. Ragazzo, supra note 131, at 1150 (noting that in Delaware the “[a]pp-
lication of the entire fairness test to move subtle freeze out schemes is less 
clear” than in the case of an explicit freeze out merger). 
 150. Id. at 1151. 
 151. See Siegel, supra note 25, at 457–65 (identifying weaknesses in the 
protections afforded to minority shareholders in majority-rule jurisdictions). 
 152. See id. at 464 (pointing out that the imposition of fiduciary duties on 
all shareholders in majority-rule jurisdictions “prevents minority shareholders 
from acting in their own self-interest”). 
 153. See id. at 467–70 (discussing recent trends toward the adoption of the 
minority rule and asserting that the “majority rule never actually attained 
that status and today represents only a thin coalition of states”). 
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could find protection through other mechanisms. Thus, despite 
the careful analysis provided by Professor Siegel, it seems fair 
to state that the Delaware approach is outside of the main-
stream.154 
C. CONVERGENCE OF COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY STATES 
Starting in the 1970s, states began to expand and explore 
the means to provide remedies to minority shareholders. State 
legislatures initiated a few experiments and gave broad author-
ity to the courts to decide the disputes. In far more states, how-
ever, the expanded protection was judicially created because 
most statutes, following the MBCA, stated merely that oppres-
sive acts could be grounds for involuntary dissolution. What 
evolved in many of these states was a regime that adopted far 
broader standards for oppression than had previously existed—
often one where the reasonable expectations of the minority 
shareholder determined whether a breach had occurred—and 
that evolution allowed courts discretion and flexibility to im-
pose a range of equitable remedies. Given that the resulting 
legislative and judicial standards provide very little preceden-
tial guidance to courts, decisions have been unpredictable, lead-
ing to continued debate over the proper balancing between mi-
nority and majority interests. 
In this complex area of law, it is difficult to make sweeping 
statements. It seems fair to conclude, however, that most com-
mon law states over the past thirty years have moved to give 
greater weight to minority-shareholder interests and to limit 
the discretion of the majority shareholder in a closely held cor-
poration. That conclusion is especially inescapable when one 
considers the shifts in two essential areas: the definition of op-
pression and the expanding menu of remedies that, as a practi-
cal matter, make it easier for judges to find oppression. In these 
areas, then, the common law states are more like the statutory 
states of California, Minnesota, and New Jersey (at least in 
practical application) than one might initially suspect. One 
could point to other indicia that would suggest that states have 
not moved decisively or at least uniformly. Regarding whether 
a minority discount or liquidity discount should be applied in 
 
 154. But see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS 816–23 (2002) (“[It] is not clear that the Delaware and Massachusetts ap-
proaches are all that dissimilar.”); Garon et al., supra note 73 passim (compar-
ing the Minnesota Business Corporation Act to its Delaware counterpart and 
accompanying case law). 
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determining the value of the shares, for example, states have 
not reached a consensus.155 
The nature and extent of the remedy for the minority 
shareholder is, however, only theoretical if she cannot prevail 
on the underlying claim of oppression, no matter how flexibly 
defined and interpreted. Thus, more modest definitions of op-
pression that encompass “unfairness” and “reasonable expecta-
tions,” combined with the court-ordered buyout remedy, make 
it easier to clear this initial hurdle. In these areas, many states, 
both common law and statutory, have begun to converge 
around one or two relatively permissive approaches. 
The prevailing view in most states is that oppression (or its 
statutory equivalent) can be established when the majority 
shareholder breaches her heightened fiduciary duties or vio-
lates the reasonable expectations of the minority share-
holder.156 Moreover, the minority shareholder in most states 
can seek a range of equitable relief, especially a court-ordered 
buyout—a factor that as a practical matter makes it easier to 
prevail on the underlying claim.157 The convergence of common 
law and statutory states is about as complete as it can be given 
the constraints of civil litigation.158 Today, then, all that is 
needed in many states to provide the desired remedy of busi-
ness separation through the buyout mechanism is one act by 
the majority that contravenes the reasonable expectations of 
the minority owner.159 
While critics of the emerging model can rightly point to its 
flaws, such as its vague standards and the nearly boundless 
discretion it puts in the hands of trial courts, it seems highly 
unlikely that the trend will be reversed in most states. Conven-
 
 155. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of 
Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DUKE L.J. 
293, 297 (2004) (“Significantly, these issues are far from settled, as there is 
considerable disagreement over the appropriateness of discounts in the share-
holder oppression setting. Indeed, the fight over discounts is perhaps the most 
frequently litigated valuation issue in close corporation disputes today.”). 
 156. See Siegel, supra note 25, at 386–87 (citing “recurring breaches of fi-
duciary duty” and “frustration of a shareholder’s reasonable expectations” as 
ways to establish oppression under the majority rule in the absence of an ex-
plicit statutory definition). 
 157.  See, e.g., Lindsay, supra note 62, at 40–42 (discussing the buyout 
remedy as one type of equitable relief afforded by New Jersey courts). 
 158. Cf. Moll, supra note 155, at 303–04 (arguing that courts have a wide 
range of relief to choose from in cases of minority shareholder oppression). 
 159. See id. at 308–09 (noting that the buyout is the most common remedy 
for oppression as established by a breach of reasonable expectations). 
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ience and lack of knowledge about the arcane differences in 
corporation law likely will continue to lead most entrepreneurs 
to incorporate in their home state, rather than in Delaware, 
even if the local model is somewhat different.160 And legisla-
tors, like those in Oregon, likely will continue to sympathize 
with the “little” shareholder who is treated harshly by the ma-
jority.161 
II.  A SIMPLE STATUTORY SOLUTION   
The developmental trends of claims and remedies for mi-
nority owner oppression are fairly clear, albeit not consistent, 
across jurisdictions. There is a general movement toward ex-
panding the bases for relief and a concurrent movement toward 
expanding the remedies available, with the buyout being the 
favored remedial approach. Still, however, dissatisfaction per-
sists. One approach that has gained a foothold in many states 
is an opt-in statute for close corporations.162 While it is beyond 
the scope of this Article to review these statutes, an opt-in 
statute clearly does not really solve the basic problem. First, 
such statutes require an affirmative act at the inception of the 
corporation.163 That is, the default regime is wrongly posited. 
 
 160. The variation in state regimes, especially the difference between most 
states and Delaware, creates a conundrum for practitioners everywhere when 
considering where a client should incorporate. Certainly Professor Ragazzo is 
correct when he observes that Delaware does not slavishly defend majority in-
terests. It is also true, however, that a practitioner advising the founder of a 
soon-to-be-created corporation on the question of where to incorporate would 
have to think twice before recommending incorporation in a state that recog-
nizes reasonable expectations or fiduciary duty doctrines for liability. That is 
true not because her own state is out of step with the nation but because it is 
out of step (as most are) with the only real alternative, Delaware. One might 
presume that, in the competition among states for incorporations, the Dela-
ware version will win out, providing the clarity that is clearly needed in this 
area of law. That presumption is misplaced. Because so many entrepreneurs 
incorporate without counsel and because the transaction costs of incorporating 
in Delaware, both real and perceived, are a barrier to others, most states will 
not feel pressure to conform to the Delaware model. 
 161. See Garrett, supra note 60, at 361–63 (reviewing how an attorney’s 
proposal for greater minority shareholder relief in close corporations led to leg-
islative change in Oregon). 
 162. See generally 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 9, § 1.16 (“The clear 
trend of recent legislation regarding close corporations has been to move be-
yond the indirect sanction of the ‘except/subject to’ clauses and to provide di-
rect support for shareholders’ agreements which intrude into director decision-
making.”). More than thirty states have some type of opt-in statute. See id. at 
n.13 (listing opt-in statutes by state). 
 163. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 343–44 (2001) (permitting close cor-
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Most shareholder disputes emerge precisely because no one 
took this step; had the shareholders been represented by coun-
sel, the shareholders would have certainly been advised about 
executing a buy-sell agreement and clearly defined employment 
agreements—steps that would probably avoid most subsequent 
litigation. Second, even these statutes do not provide what is 
proposed here, that is, the right of a minority shareholder to 
achieve separation and liquidity on demand.164 Thus, these 
separate opt-in statutes, while hypothetically useful, do not 
solve the shareholder-oppression problem, as the plaintiff in 
the Delaware case of Nixon v. Blackwell painfully discovered. 
The current panoply of claims and relief does not efficiently 
address the underlying problems of majority power and minor-
ity illiquidity in the closely held business. The most important 
problem in the current system is that the disgruntled minority 
owner must prove some predicate act or pattern of wrongful 
conduct by the majority owners to obtain relief. Whether 
termed oppression, breach of fiduciary duty, or frustration of 
reasonable expectations, the minority shareholder must prove 
wrongdoing.165 As stated in this Article’s introductory quota-
 
poration formation at inception or by amendment). 
 164. See Moll, Minority Oppression & the LLC, supra note 16, at 900. 
Despite the lack of a market and the difficulty of attracting outside 
purchasers, close corporation minority shareholders would still have 
effective exit rights if they could force the corporation (or the control-
ling shareholder) to purchase their shares on demand. A default buy-
out right would insure that a minority shareholder could recover the 
value of its investment and would thwart any controlling shareholder 
effort to confiscate the minority’s capital. No state’s corporation law, 
however, provides such a right. Without an explicit buyout provision 
in a stockholder’s agreement or the company’s organizational docu-
ments, corporate shareholders have no right to compel a redemption 
of their holdings. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 165. The MBCA attempts to solve the liquidity problem by providing a 
buyout provision that is available to the corporation or the remaining share-
holders after the litigation has begun. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 
(2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/library/onlinepublications/ 
mbca2002.pdf. However, the structure of the provision probably does not avoid 
the mud-slinging problem. First, the option of the buyout is in the hands of the 
corporation or the allegedly oppressing shareholders. Thus, as a practical mat-
ter, the complaining shareholder would probably need to assemble a powerful 
prima facie case before the corporation would cave in to his or her demands. 
Second, the buyout provision does not answer the difficult question of “fair 
value.” Again, as a practical matter, the complaining shareholder may be more 
likely to avoid a discount on the shares if he generates a “compelling” case. 
Even if the matter of discounts is well-settled in the jurisdiction, the complain-
ing shareholder has an incentive to sling mud because section 14.34(f ) pro-
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tions, “[t]he business divorce had begun in earnest and eventu-
ally found its way, as most divorces do, into the hands of a 
judge for resolution of issues colored much more by emotion 
than economic or business reality.”166 However, because there 
is no concept of no-fault divorce (or even irreconcilable differ-
ences) for business dissolutions, the mud of mistreatment alle-
gations must be slung, and litigants (and courts) must muddle 
through the quagmire. 
The evolution of the doctrinal law of oppression evidences a 
continued loosening of the requirements for courts to achieve 
the goal of granting a remedial divorce. Furthermore, this evo-
lution has, similar to its marital dissolution analog, produced 
an ever-lowered hurdle necessary to cross to reach the desired 
remedial result. The ineluctable trends identified herein of 
loosening liability standards and acceptance of the buyout of 
the minority owner as the preferred remedial resolution signal 
a more rational approach. 
One relatively simple solution would be to provide a self-
executing (that is, non-judicial) separation mechanism that 
would operate like a statutory buy-sell agreement. In many 
shareholder disputes, the minority shareholder essentially 
seeks liquidity, but in order to get that liquidity he must also 
allege that the majority’s conduct meets the standard of liabil-
ity—an inevitably messy inquiry. Moreover, under many tradi-
tional and some modern statutes, the minority shareholder will 
also hold the Damocles sword of potential dissolution over the 
other shareholders. The majority shareholders, of course, will 
respond by alleging fiduciary or contractual breaches in return. 
These battles are often inefficient but necessary predicates 
to providing the minority owner with liquidity and to determine 
exit-strategy value. A more efficient approach would permit in 
law what the parties, if they had been well advised by attor-
neys, may have already provided by contract: a buy-sell agree-
ment at fair value—a kind of no-fault divorce. 
 
vides for “reasonable fees and expenses of counsel and of any experts employed 
by him” if the court finds that the shareholder had “probable grounds for relief
” on the oppression claim. See id. § 14.34(f ). 
 166. Conklin v. Perdue, No. 990335BLS, 2002 WL 31421763, at *5 (Super. 
Ct. Mass. Sept. 17, 2002). 
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A. THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE 
SECTION ____: [MODEL] MANDATORY BUYOUT 
PROVISION 
Subdivision 1: Owner Buyout Right 
  Upon written notice to a non-publicly held company 
by a minority owner of a desire to sell all of the owner’s 
interest in the company, the company shall purchase 
(and the owner shall sell) all of the minority owner’s in-
terest at fair market value. If the sale is in connection 
with the resignation or removal of the owner as a direc-
tor, officer, manager, or employee of the business, then 
the purchase shall be at full value. In either case, the 
purchase shall take place within sixty (60) days of re-
ceipt of the original notice and be for cash unless, upon 
application by the company to a court of competent ju-
risdiction, the company demonstrates that payment in 
cash is impracticable, in which case payment shall be 
made upon such terms and conditions as the court in its 
sole discretion deems just and reasonable in the circum-
stances. 
Subdivision 2: Company Buyout Right 
  Upon written notice by a non-publicly held company 
to a minority owner of a desire to purchase all of the mi-
nority owner’s interest in the company, the owner shall 
sell (and the company shall purchase) all of the minority 
owner’s interest to the company at full value. The pur-
chase shall be for cash. 
Subdivision 3: Procedure for Determining Buyout Price; 
Binding Effect 
  Determination of the value of the owner’s shares un-
der Subdivision 1 or 2 shall be made by agreement of 
the parties within thirty (30) days. If the company and 
the owner cannot agree upon the purchase price within 
thirty (30) days after the buyout notice is received, then 
within ten (10) days thereafter they shall jointly desig-
nate an appraiser. If they are unable within that ten 
(10) day period to agree on an appraiser, then the com-
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pany and the selling owner shall each designate an ap-
praiser and the two designated appraisers shall choose a 
third appraiser to conduct the appraisal. The appraiser 
so chosen shall thereupon as promptly as possible ap-
praise and determine the value of the owner’s interest 
as of the date of the buyout notice. For the purpose of 
making the appraisal, the appraiser shall be given ac-
cess to, and may review, all relevant documents, records 
and information available to the company. The ap-
praiser shall prepare and submit a written appraisal to 
the company and to the selling owner. The value so de-
termined shall be the buyout price, shall be binding on 
both parties and shall not be subject to challenge or ap-
peal except for fraud or illegality. All costs of conducting 
the appraisal shall be borne by the company. The buy-
out price, whenever determined, shall be paid within ten 
(10) days after determination. 
Subdivision 4: Effect of Existing Litigation; Settlement of 
Claims 
  Any termination of an owner’s interest pursuant to 
Subdivision 1 or 2 of this Section shall be in lieu of and 
in release of and settlement for all claims between the 
selling owner and the company, the company’s other 
owners, directors, officers, managers, and employees re-
lated in any manner to the selling of the owner’s par-
ticipation in the business and any expectations related 
to that participation. 
Subdivision 5: Effect of Existing Buyout Agreement or 
Litigation 
  A buyout pursuant to this Section cannot be pursued 
to the extent that there exists a valid written agreement 
between the company and the owner related to the 
owner’s right to sell the owner’s interests to the com-
pany or the company’s right to purchase the owner’s in-
terests from the owner under the conditions identified in 
this Section. Such an agreement may be reflected in a 
contract or in the company’s charter, operating agree-
ment, bylaws, or other binding company document[, and 
must specify that it applies in lieu of this Section]. In 
those circumstances the agreement of the parties con-
trols. 
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  Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties, 
this Section is inapplicable to the extent that the parties 
are engaged in ongoing litigation related to the relation-
ship of the owner to the company. 
Subdivision 6: Definitions 
For purposes of this Section, 
  “Non-publicly held company” means a company that 
does not have a class of equity securities registered pur-
suant to section 12, and is not subject to section 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.167 
  “Full value” means the selling owner’s proportionate 
share of the enterprise (going concern) value of the com-
pany, undiscounted for minority, marketability or other 
reasons. 
  “Fair market value” means the selling owner’s pro-
portionate share of the enterprise (going concern) value 
of the company, discounted, to the extent appropriate in 
the circumstances, for minority or marketability rea-
sons. 
  “In connection with the resignation or removal” 
means within [six months] of the buyout notice. 
  “Minority owner” means a person who does not pos-
sess actual power to control the operations of the com-
pany, as usually evidenced by the size of the owner’s in-
terest. 
Subdivision 7: Costs and Attorney’s Fees 
  If a court determines that a party has acted in bad 
faith either to enforce or to avoid the application or ef-
fectiveness of this Section, a court may award costs and 
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party seeking action 
consistent with this Section. 
 
 
 167. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78o 
(2000). 
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B. APPLICATION AND BENEFITS OF THE STATUTE 
Under this model statute, the minority owner effectively 
has a “put” to the company and the company has a “call” upon 
the minority owner’s shares. The buyout is self-executing. This 
reversal of the current default regime, which presumes illiquid-
ity for the minority owner, is the revolutionary aspect of the 
proposal. That is, the commencement of litigation is not neces-
sary and no showing of wrongdoing is required. The statute is 
intended to apply to all types of businesses, including—
importantly—both corporations and limited liability companies. 
Moreover, the companies covered are those that have not made 
a public offering of stock and are not otherwise considered by 
the federal securities laws to be publicly held. 
The model statute is designed to fill a gap where pre-
planning has not occurred. Therefore, if the parties have al-
ready dealt with the issues of liquidity by a valid agreement, 
whether embodied in a contract or in the company’s forma-
tional documents, then Subdivision 5.A provides that the 
agreement of the parties preempts the statute.168 Absent such 
an agreement, when the minority investor in a closely held 
business seeks liquidity and a termination of the owner-
company relationship, the statute provides the exit mechanism 
and its terms. 
The disengaging owner will be compensated according to 
one of two commonly used measures of value depending on his 
or her status with the firm prior to the buyout.169 If the minor-
ity owner’s only relation to the company is as an investor, then 
the buyout price will be “fair market value”—the price at which 
the ownership interest would change hands between a willing 
seller and a willing buyer when the former is not compelled to 
sell and the latter is not compelled to buy, both having reason-
able knowledge of the relevant facts. Fair market value is ad-
justed appropriately to reflect any applicable marketability and 
 
 168. Statutory preclusion is only effective where the existing buy-sell 
agreement between the parties is valid. If the agreement itself is invalid or 
does not reference the rights being given up under the model statute, the 
model statute will apply. Similarly, if there is ongoing litigation between the 
parties related to the minority owner’s relationship with the company, the 
model statute presumptively does not apply. 
 169. See generally Moll, supra note 155 (discussing the state of the law re-
garding definitions of value and discounts in shareholder oppression contexts). 
As to the two approaches to valuation, see id. at 296–97 and 310–14. 
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minority discounts. This “fair market value” price approxi-
mates the actual value of the shares or other ownership inter-
ests in the minority owner’s possession. 
If the minority owner is severing other relationships with 
the company, or if the company has recently severed those rela-
tionships (or severs them shortly after the buyout notice is 
given), then the buyout price is full value. Full value represents 
the minority owner’s proportionate share of enterprise value. 
This enhanced buyout price reflects the presumed reality that 
the minority shareholder’s other relationships to the company 
have some implicit value170 or the benefit to the company of be-
ing able to sever the owner’s relationship with the company 
with ease. 
While the minority shareholder can initiate the buyout, the 
company is not necessarily required to pay out a substantial 
amount of company value without recourse. The statute pro-
vides that the buyout will be administered by the courts upon 
request, and courts may tell minority shareholders who want 
their liquidity at a particularly inopportune moment that they 
have to wait. The company, for example, may be permitted to 
buy back the shares over time. 
Moreover, the statute exacts a price from the minority 
owner as well. If the minority owner seeks a buyout under this 
provision, the value of the minority shareholder’s interest may 
be discounted. After all, the typical rationale for awarding the 
full value of the minority interest is predicated on the idea that 
an oppressing shareholder should not be permitted to benefit 
from his own inequitable behavior. For example, if the majority 
shareholder so limits the minority’s investment return either 
by limiting dividends or by freezing the minority out of alterna-
tive compensation opportunities, such as employment, those al-
legedly oppressive techniques may force the minority to seek 
relief by way of a buyout. The majority owner, having created 
the reasons for the relief sought, should not additionally benefit 
by paying a discounted price to the exiting minority owner. Un-
der this statute, however, there would be no allegation of op-
pression, hence no justification for a buyout at full value. Since 
 
 170. Id. at 338–45 (describing how higher buyout prices are justified be-
cause “the fair value buyout leaves the employment and management compo-
nents of a close corporations shareholder’s investment unprotected”). Full 
value also accords with what the minority shareholder would receive in a 
merger situation where all shares receive the same pro rata proportion and 
value of the merger consideration. Id. at 323. 
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this statute would not replace oppression law that has devel-
oped in each state, a shareholder could still bring a claim of op-
pression, but if he or she prefers a buyout, the incentive to liti-
gate is in most cases reduced to the amount of the discount. 
This solution continues to serve the states’ interest in having a 
remedy for truly egregious oppressive conduct, yet it reduces 
the likelihood of lawsuits in the cases that fall, as so many do, 
in the gray area of the law between true minority investor mis-
treatment and a simple falling out between previously com-
patible entrepreneurs. 
For its part, the company has a call on the minority 
owner’s shares. This right to buy avoids typical and sometimes 
complicated majority squeeze-out techniques, such as a 
squeeze-out merger, that majority owners often otherwise em-
ploy. The price of the call option is the payment of the full, un-
discounted value in cash to the minority owner. 
C. POTENTIAL ISSUES AND LIMITATIONS 
One of the most important questions is how the proposed 
statute relates to the existing laws of closely held business dis-
putes. First, the statute eliminates all closely held business 
disputes to the extent that it is applicable and employed. It is 
designed not only to operate outside of the judicial arena, but 
also to put to rest all claims between the parties. Indeed, if 
deemed necessary or appropriate to make this point, Subdivi-
sion 4 of the model statute could include a provision that, upon 
closing, the parties will provide mutual general releases. 
On the other hand, the model statute as drafted is not 
mandatory. A minority owner could still pursue an action for 
oppression under the state’s existing statutory or common law. 
Such an action may be warranted where non-monetary relief, 
such as an accounting or appointment of a provisional director, 
is the primary remedy sought. In addition, minority owners 
may still want to sue for relief if their contract rights as em-
ployees or managers have been abrogated and substantial non-
investment related compensation is involved. To the extent 
that such claims do not arise from explicit contract provisions 
but rather from the alleged reasonable expectations of the 
owner/employee, the statute provides surrogate compensation 
in the form of a full value buyout. It is to be expected that the 
availability of this remedy will relieve the courts of many po-
tentially contrived—or at least un-provable—claims based on a 
minority owner’s purported reasonable expectations. 
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There may be some concern that the model statute might 
be used as a tactical tool. For example, a minority owner might 
initiate a lawsuit for oppression with the recognition that the 
model statute provides a fall-back minimal remedy if the law-
suit becomes too costly, too difficult, or unlikely to succeed. Al-
ternatively the company might trigger the statutory buy out to 
avoid claims of fraud or breach of contract based on prior con-
duct. To avoid these opportunistic ploys, Subdivision 5.B of the 
statute presumptively precludes use of the statutory buyout 
mechanism to the extent that litigation by the minority owner 
has been commenced seeking relief for fraud, oppression, or re-
lated conduct.171 
Additionally, the statute is not intended to, nor do its 
terms preclude, derivative litigation—that is, litigation brought 
seeking relief on behalf of the company rather than the indi-
vidual shareholder. On the other hand, derivative claims usu-
ally involve messy issues of demand, futility, and special litiga-
tion committees. Owners having only derivative allegations to 
pursue instead may avail themselves of the exit strategy of the 
model statute. Of course, upon sale of their interests under the 
statute, their standing to pursue any derivative claims would 
disappear. 
  CONCLUSION   
One of the messiest areas of current business organization 
law is the appropriate manner of dealing with closely held 
business disputes. These situations often arise from relation-
ships that have evolved over time and may involve more than 
simply issues of money. Like marriages and other personal re-
lationships, business relationships may succeed or flounder 
over time, sometimes resulting in irreconcilable alienation be-
tween or among the participants. 
 
 171. Of course no statute can anticipate all the potential egregious tactics 
that ill-willed persons may employ. For example, a company might, in viola-
tion of clear contractual obligations, terminate a minority owner’s secured em-
ployment and immediately purport to exercise its call rights under the model 
statute in hopes of precluding the inevitable and meritorious lawsuit and se-
curing a mandatory release from the minority owner at the price of a full value 
buyout. While the minority owner might accept that proposal, courts of equity 
are well equipped to deal with such abuses and would not be constrained to 
apply the model statute. Indeed, the supposed hypothetical actions outlined 
here should be determined to be oppressive conduct warranting relief from the 
operation of the model statute itself. 
MATHESON&MALER_4FMT 2/16/2007 9:51:51 AM 
2007] A STATUTORY SOLUTION 699 
 
While existing jurisprudence has evolved to be more flexi-
ble and accommodating in these circumstances, it does not pro-
vide for an effective no-fault divorce for relationships in the 
closely held business. Instead, minority owners trapped in an 
unsuccessful relationship with an illiquid investment have to 
point the finger of fault and prove the oppressive conduct of the 
other party in order to gain the prospect of relief. This method 
of resolving these failed relationships is wasteful and ineffec-
tive at providing the separation most likely sought by the mi-
nority business investor. 
The proposed model buyout statute would provide the nec-
essary mechanism for effective non-judicial resolution of failed 
business relationships in the successful closely held business. 
Whether the minority owner seeks simple separation and li-
quidity or the majority seeks to proceed unencumbered by con-
cerns of alleged improper conduct, either or both of these par-
ties have an effective tool to go their separate ways. It is 
suggested here that business people will welcome this opportu-
nity to resolve their conflict without the resort to costly and ac-
rimonious litigation, all to the great benefit of both business 
owners and the judicial system.  
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 APPENDIX  
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION STANDARDS AND REMEDIES 
 
This chart includes the most important aspects of our fifty-state survey. 
 
“Fiduciary Duty” generally means that the majority shareholder owes some type of duty to the minor-
ity shareholders and that a breach of that duty can be grounds for a cause of action (though the scope of 
that duty varies greatly from state to state). The “heightened standard” is the oldest and most exacting. 
 
The third column describes the type of dissolution statute. A “Narrow” statute is generally one that 
permits for involuntary dissolution by a shareholder when others have acted in an “oppressive” manner but 
that gives no additional legislative guidance. A statute that is “Extremely Narrow” permits shareholder ac-
tions by less than a majority but does not use the word “oppressive” or “oppression.” (The parenthetical ex-
planation gives further detail: The phrase “I&F” means that the statute permits dissolution on a showing of 
“illegality” and “fraud,” while in the others dissolution is only permitted for “deadlock.”) The statutes described 
as “No Minority Actions” are the narrowest and appear to give no grounds for a minority shareholder action 
for oppression. In states with “Expansive” statutes, the legislatures generally have attempted in define in 
some broad way what standard of liability is to be applied. 
 
 
 
M
ATH
ESO
N&
M
ALER_4FM
T 
2/16/2007 9:51:51 AM
 
2007] 
A STATU
TO
R
Y SO
LU
TIO
N
 
701 
  
 
State Standard of  Liability 
Type of  
Dissolution 
Statute 
Citation Buyout as a Remedy? 
Case Law Applying 
Standard of Liability Comments About Buyout 
Alabama Heightened Narrow ALA. CODE § 10-2B-14.30 (2006). Yes Fulton v. Callahan, 621 So. 2d 
1235 (Ala. 1993); Abel v. Forrest 
Realty, Inc., 484 So. 2d 1069 
(Ala. 1986). 
Authorized by statute. ALA. 
CODE § 10-2B-14.34 (election to 
purchase in lieu of dissolution). 
Alaska Reasonable 
Expectations 
Expansive ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(5) 
(2005).  
Yes See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 
P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985) 
(interpreting a predecessor stat-
ute).  
Shareholders can avoid dissolu-
tion by purchasing shares. See 
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.630; 
Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 
621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980) 
(discussing Alaska law allowing 
a shareholder to bring an action 
to liquidate corporate assets 
upon a showing that the acts of 
the directors are illegal, oppres-
sive, or fraudulent). 
Arizona Heightened Narrow ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1430 
(2006). 
Yes King v. Coulter, 550 P.2d 623 
(Ariz. 1976) (interpreting a 
predecessor statute). 
Shareholders can avoid dissolu-
tion by purchasing shares. ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1434.  
Arkansas Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-1108 
(2001). 
Unclear Smith v. Leonard, 876 S.W.2d 
266, 272 (Ark. 1994), citing with 
approval In re Kemp & Beatley, 
Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 
1984). 
Smith was a matter of first im-
pression, and the court did not 
need to reach the question of a 
buyout. 876 S.W.2d at 272. 
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State Standard of  Liability 
Type of  
Dissolution 
Statute 
Citation Buyout as a Remedy? 
Case Law Applying 
Standard of Liability Comments About Buyout 
California When  
“reasonably 
necessary” to 
protect the 
moving party 
Expansive CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) 
(West 1990 & Supp. 2006). 
Yes Stuparich v. Harbor Furniture 
Mfg., Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313 
(Ct. App. 2000); Bauer v. Bauer, 
54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 382 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (refusing to read 
“reasonable expectations” into 
the statute). 
California has an optional buy-
out provision. See CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 2000 (West Supp. 2006).  
Colorado Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-114-301 
(2005). 
Unclear Colt v. Mt. Princeton Trout 
Club, Inc., 78 P.3d 1115 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2003). 
See Polk v. Hergert Land & Cat-
tle Co., 5 P.3d 402 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2000) (noting without de-
ciding the possibility of a buyout 
instead of dissolution of a family 
farm). 
Connecticut Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-896 
(2005). 
Yes Stone v. R.E.A.L. Health, P.C., 
No. CV98414972, 2000 WL 
33158565, at *12 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 15, 2000) (finding that 
the facts could not support a 
claim that the plaintiff ’s rea-
sonable expectations were de-
feated). 
The statute permits buyout in 
lieu of dissolution. CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 33-900 (West 
2006). 
Delaware None No Minority 
Actions 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 
(2001). 
No Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 
1366 (Del. 1993). 
 
Florida Fraud &  
Illegality 
Extremely 
Narrow  
(I&F) 
FLA. STAT. § 607.1430 (2005). Yes See Cox Enter., Inc. v. News-
Journal Corp., No. 
604CV6980RL28KRS, 2005 WL 
2675008 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 
2005) (finding that the facts met 
the statutory standard). 
The statute permits buyout of 
the complaining shareholder. 
FLA. STAT. § 607.1436. 
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State Standard of  Liability 
Type of  
Dissolution 
Statute 
Citation Buyout as a Remedy? 
Case Law Applying 
Standard of Liability Comments About Buyout 
Georgia Fraud & 
Illegality 
Extremely 
Narrow  
(I&F) 
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1430 
(2003 & Supp. 2006). 
Yes for 
statutory 
close  
corporations. 
Probably for 
all others. 
The case law defining these 
terms is not well developed. See 
West v. West, 825 F. Supp. 1033 
(N.D. Ga. 1992) (allowing the 
unclean hands doctrine to pre-
vent evaluation of the substan-
tive question). 
See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1430 
cmts. (suggesting that courts 
retain equitable powers to fash-
ion remedies). 
Hawaii Fiduciary Duty Narrow HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-411 
(2004). 
Yes See Mroz v. Hoaloha Na Eha, 
Inc., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 
1130–31 (D. Haw. 2005); Perl v. 
IU Int’l. Corp., 607 P.2d 1036, 
1046 (Haw. 1980) (recognizing a 
fiduciary duty owed in squeeze-
out merger). 
The statute permits buyout of a 
complaining shareholder. HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 414-415. 
Idaho Heightened Narrow IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-1430 
(2005). 
Yes See Rowland v. Rowland, 633 
P.2d 599, 606 (Idaho 1981). 
The statute permits buyout in 
lieu of dissolution. IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 30-1-1434. 
Illinois Reasonable 
Expectations 
Expansive 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/12.56 (West Supp. 2006). 
Yes See Schirmer v. Bear, 648 
N.E.2d 1131, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995) (permitting buyout of 
shares). 
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/12.56. 
Indiana Fiduciary Duty Extremely 
Narrow 
(Deadlock) 
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-47-1 
(LexisNexis 1999). 
Yes G&N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boahm, 
743 N.E.2d 227, 243 (Ind. 2001); 
Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 
562–63 (Ind. 1995). 
G&N Aircraft, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 
at 244 (“[A buyout] amounts to a 
forced withdrawal of capital 
from the enterprise . . . .”). 
Iowa Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1430 
(West 1999). 
Yes Maschmeier v. Southside Press, 
Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377, 380–81 
(Iowa Ct. App. 1988). 
The statute permits buyout in 
lieu of dissolution. IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 490.1434. 
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State Standard of  Liability 
Type of  
Dissolution 
Statute 
Citation Buyout as a Remedy? 
Case Law Applying 
Standard of Liability Comments About Buyout 
Kansas Fiduciary Duty No Minority 
Actions 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6812 
(1995). 
Unclear Mynatt v. Collis, 57 P.3d 513, 
529 (Kan. 2002); Richards v. 
Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 647–48 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1994). 
See Mynatt, 57 P.3d at 531–34 
(discussing the equitable nature 
of set-offs in various settings). 
Kentucky Unclear Extremely 
Narrow  
(I&F) 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.14-
300 (LexisNexis 2003). 
Unclear See Dingus v. Fada Serv. Co., 
856 S.W.2d 45, 48–49 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1993); Yeager v. Paul Se-
monin Co., 691 S.W.2d 227, 
228–29 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). 
 
Louisiana Heightened Extremely 
Narrow 
(Deadlock) 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:143, 
:151 (1993). 
No Streb v. Abramson-Caro Clinic, 
401 So. 2d 410, 414 (La. Ct. 
App. 1981). 
See Streb, 401 So. 2d at 414 
(“[A]ppropriate relief for a mi-
nority stockholder in a close 
corporation has been given dif-
ferent remedies in different 
states . . . .”). 
Maine Fiduciary Duty Narrow ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, 
§ 1430 (2005).  
Yes Thompson’s Point, Inc. v. Safe 
Harbor Dev. Corp., 862 F. Supp. 
594, 601 (D. Me. 1994) (applying 
a predecessor statute). 
The statute affords the court 
alternate remedies. ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1434. 
Maryland Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS 
§ 3-413 (LexisNexis 1999). 
Yes Edenbaum v. Schwarcz-
Osztreicherne, 885 A.2d 365, 
379–80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2005).  
Edenbaum, 885 A.2d at 380–81 
(holding that equitable remedies 
in addition to dissolution are 
available). 
Massachusetts Fiduciary Duty Extremely 
Narrow 
(Deadlock) 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, 
§ 14.30 (West 2005). 
Yes Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 
N.E.2d 351, 353–54 (Mass. 
1996); Donahue v. Rodd Electro-
type Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518–
20 (Mass. 1975). 
See Orsi v. Sunshine Art Stu-
dios, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 471, 
475–76 (D. Mass. 1995); Keeting 
v. Keeting, Nos. 00749, 00748, 
2003 WL 23213143, at *19 (Su-
per. Ct. Mass. Oct. 3, 2003). 
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State Standard of  Liability 
Type of  
Dissolution 
Statute 
Citation Buyout as a Remedy? 
Case Law Applying 
Standard of Liability Comments About Buyout 
Michigan Willfully  
Unfair &  
Oppressive 
Narrow MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1489 
(2002 & Supp. 2006). 
Yes Franchino v. Franchino, 687 
N.W.2d 620, 627–29 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
Authorized by statute. MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 450.1489. 
Minnesota Reasonable 
Expectations 
Expansive MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2004).  Yes Berreman v. W. Publ’g Co., 615 
N.W.2d 362, 374–75 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
Authorized by statute. MINN. 
STAT. § 302A.751, subdiv. 1.  
Mississippi Fiduciary Duty Narrow MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-14.30 
(2001). 
Yes Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 
167, 169–72 (Miss. 1989) 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-14.34 
(permitting other shareholders 
to buy out the complaining 
shareholder).  
Missouri Heightened Narrow MO. REV. STAT. § 351.494 (2001 
& Supp. 2006). 
Unclear Churchman v. Kehr, 836 S.W.2d 
473, 481–83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
See 21 W., Inc. v. Meadowgreen 
Trails, Inc., 913 S.W.2d 858, 867 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (ordering a 
buyout of shares in a dispute 
arising from a real estate trans-
action). 
Montana Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938 
(2005). 
Yes Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 
P.2d 929, 932–33 (Mont. 1982). 
Authorized by statute. MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 35-1-939. 
Nebraska Fiduciary Duty Narrow NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20,162 
(1997). 
Yes Sadler v. Jorad, Inc., 680 
N.W.2d 165, 172–73 (Neb. 
2004); Anderson v. Clemens 
Mobile Homes, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 
900, 904–05 (Neb. 1983). 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20,166 
(permitting other shareholders 
to buy out the complaining 
shareholder). 
Nevada Heightened  Extremely 
Narrow  
(I&F) 
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.585, .650 
(2004). 
Yes Bedore v. Familian, 125 P.3d 
1168, 1172 (Nev. 2006). 
Bedore, 125 P.3d at 1172–72 
(“[T]he district court lacked the 
proper basis to order a buy-
out.”). 
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State Standard of  Liability 
Type of  
Dissolution 
Statute 
Citation Buyout as a Remedy? 
Case Law Applying 
Standard of Liability Comments About Buyout 
New Hamp-
shire 
Fiduciary Duty Extremely 
Narrow  
(I&F) 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293 
-A:14.30 (1999). 
Yes See Durham v. Durham, 871 
A.2d 41, 44 (N.H. 2005) (holding 
that a minority shareholder can 
bring a direct claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293 
-A:14.34 (permitting other 
shareholders to buy out the 
complaining shareholder). 
New Jersey Reasonable 
Expectations 
Expansive N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c) 
(West 2003).  
Yes Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 
1019, 1029–30 (N.J. 1993). 
Authorized by statute. See N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c). 
New Mexico Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-16 
(West 2003). 
Yes McCauley v. Tom McCauley & 
Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 236–41 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1986); see also 
Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, 
P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 458–49 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2001). 
See McCauley, 724 P.2d at 236 
(“An order of corporate dissolu-
tion is a drastic remedy and 
should be utilized sparingly, 
after consideration of other al-
ternative forms of relief.”) 
New York Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104-a 
(McKinney 2003). 
Yes In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 
N.E.2d 1173, 1179–81 (N.Y. 
1984). 
Authorized by statute. N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. LAW § 1118. 
North Carolina Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow  
(but not 
MBCA model) 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 
(2005). 
Yes Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 
S.E.2d 551, 561–64 (N.C. 1983); 
Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair 
Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 518–20 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000). 
Authorized by statute. N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 55-14-31. 
North Dakota Reasonable 
Expectations 
Expansive N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1 
-115(4) (2005). 
Yes Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 
383, 387–88 (N.D. 1987) (con-
struing a predecessor statute). 
Broad equitable relief author-
ized by statute. N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 10-19.1-115. 
 
 
 
M
ATH
ESO
N&
M
ALER_4FM
T 
2/16/2007 9:51:51 AM
 
2007] 
A STATU
TO
R
Y SO
LU
TIO
N
 
707 
  
State Standard of  Liability 
Type of  
Dissolution 
Statute 
Citation Buyout as a Remedy? 
Case Law Applying 
Standard of Liability Comments About Buyout 
Ohio Fiduciary Duty Extremely 
Narrow 
(Deadlock) 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91 
(LexisNexis 2004). 
Yes Reynolds v. Wingers, 621 
N.E.2d 1239, 1242–43 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding termination 
of employment was not a breach 
of fiduciary duty in this case); 
Estate of Schroer v. Stamco 
Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 
979–81 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
See Estate of Schroer, 482 
N.E.2d at 981 (affirming trial 
court’s order to purchase 
shares). 
Oklahoma Unclear No Minority 
Actions 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§§ 1096, 1104 (West 1999). 
Unclear See Sutter v. Sutter Ranching 
Corp., 14 P.3d 58, 62 n.18 (Okla. 
2000). 
 
Oregon Reasonable 
Expectations 
Expansive OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 60.661(2)(b), 60.952 (West 
2003).  
Yes See Baker v. Commercial Body 
Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395 
(Or. 1973) (construing a prede-
cessor statute). 
See Baker, 507 P.2d at 396 (out-
lining alternatives to a dissolu-
tion remedy). 
Pennsylvania Fiduciary Duty Narrow 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1981 
(2001). 
Yes In re Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 412 A.2d 1099, 1102–03 
(Pa. 1980); Baron v. Pritzker, 
No. 1574 Aug. Term 2000, 2001 
WL 1855054 (Pa. D.&C. Mar. 6, 
2001). 
Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 
1548, 1560 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (or-
dering a buyout instead of the 
“extraordinary measure of disso-
lution”). 
Rhode Island Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow  
(but see new 
opt-in statute 
for close  
corporations) 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1314 
(Supp. 2005). 
Yes Hendrick v. Hendrick, 755 A.2d 
784, 791 (R.I. 2000) (discussing 
favorably the reasonable expec-
tations standard in construing 
the predecessor statute). 
The statute authorizes a buyout 
in lieu of dissolution. R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 7-1.2-1315. 
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State Standard of  Liability 
Type of  
Dissolution 
Statute 
Citation Buyout as a Remedy? 
Case Law Applying 
Standard of Liability Comments About Buyout 
South Carolina Unfairly  
Prejudicial 
(reasonable 
expectations 
may be a  
factor) 
Narrow  
(also for  
“unfairly 
prejudicial” 
conduct) 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300 
(2006). 
Yes See Kiriakides v. Atlas Food 
Sys. & Servs., Inc. 541 S.E.2d 
257, 263–66 (S.C. 2001). 
Authorized by statute. S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 33-14-310. 
South Dakota Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A 
-1430 (Supp. 2006). 
Yes Mueller v. Cedar Shore Resort, 
Inc., 643 N.W.2d 56, 64 (S.D. 
2002); Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 
N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 1997). 
The statute authorizes a buyout 
in lieu of dissolution. S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 47-1A-1434. 
Tennessee Fiduciary Duty Narrow TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-301 
(2002). 
Yes Hall v. Tenn. Dressed Beef Co., 
957 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Tenn. 
1997). But see Cochran v. L.V.R. 
& R.C., Inc., No. M2004-01382-
COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2217067, 
at *4–5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 
2005) (applying the reasonable 
expectations test). 
 
Texas Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 
7.05 (Vernon 2005). 
Yes Willis v. Bydalek, 997 S.W.2d 
798, 801 (Tex. App. 1999); Davis 
v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 381 
(Tex. App. 1988). 
See Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 378–79 
(“An ordered ‘buy-out’ of stock at 
its fair value is an especially 
appropriate remedy in a closely-
held corporation.”). 
Utah Fiduciary Duty 
(emerging) 
Narrow UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1430 
(2005). 
Yes Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. 
Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 
1273, 1279 (Utah 1998). 
The statute authorizes a buyout 
in lieu of dissolution. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1434. 
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State Standard of  Liability 
Type of  
Dissolution 
Statute 
Citation Buyout as a Remedy? 
Case Law Applying 
Standard of Liability Comments About Buyout 
Vermont Unclear Narrow VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 14.30 
(1997 & Supp. 2005). 
Yes Waller v. Am. Int’l Distrib. 
Corp., 706 A.2d 460, 461 (Vt. 
1997) (upholding lower court 
determination that a freeze out 
was “oppressive” without dis-
cussing the legal standard). 
Waller, 706 A.2d at 462–63 
(evaluating the meaning of “fair 
value”). 
Virginia Heightened Narrow VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 
(2006). 
No Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 
S.E.2d 725, 730 (Va. 1990). 
See Giannotti, 387 S.E.2d at 733 
(holding that dissolution is the 
exclusive remedy under the 
statute). 
Washington Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 23B.14.300 (West Supp. 2006) 
(amended June 7, 2006). 
Yes Scott v. Trans-Sys., Inc., 64 P.3d 
1 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). 
See Scott, 64 P.3d at 9–10 (citing 
Baker remedies). 
West Virginia Fiduciary Duty Narrow W. VA. CODE § 31D-14-1430 
(2006). 
Yes Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 
S.E.2d 433, 440 (W.Va. 1980).  
See Masinter, 262 S.E.2d at 441 
n.12 (citing available relief from 
oppressive conduct). The statute 
authorizes buyout in lieu of dis-
solution. W. VA. CODE § 31D-14-
1434.  
Wisconsin Reasonable 
Expectations 
Narrow WIS. STAT. § 180.1430 (2005). Unclear Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 
582 N.W.2d 98, (Wis. Ct. App. 
1998). 
See Jorgensen, 582 N.W.2d at 
107, n.11 (“[W]e do not decide 
whether or under what circum-
stances a trial court must dis-
solve a corporation if a statutory 
ground is established.”). 
Wyoming Fiduciary Duty Narrow WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1430 
(2005). 
Unclear J Bar H, Inc. v. Johnson, 822 
P.2d 849 (Wyo. 1991). 
 
 
